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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Thomas Schlesinger for the Master 
of Science in Political Science presented June 29, 1995. 
Title: North vs. South: Sovereign Equality and the 
Environment in the Twentieth Century. 
Although Third World states lack military and economic 
strength, they still are able to exert considerable influence 
on certain international issues. The proliferation of small 
states following World War II, coupled with the twentieth 
century acceptance of the norm of sovereign equality, has 
enabled the weak states of the international system to 
challenge the order established by the strong. While Third 
World nations are weak according to traditional measures of 
power, sovereign equality and bloc voting by the small states, 
have accorded a type of "conditional" power to the South. 
This conditional power is augmented by the advent of a 
new international issue, the environment. Because of their 
large populations and natural resource bases, developing 
countries significantly influence environmental problems and 
therefore have greater leverage in environmental negotiations. 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that because of the 
military and economic weakness of the South, it has sought to 
develop alternative sources of international strength. These 
new sources take advantage of norms and issues particular to 
twentieth century world politics. While these other sources 
thus far lack the potency of military or economic power, they 
do provide the South with a limited, but nonetheless important 
amount of influence in international politics. 
This thesis analyzes the nature and scope of the South's 
power arising out of the acceptance of the norm of sovereign 
equality. The paper also studies a second source of strength 
for developing nations, negative power; this power is based on 
the South's ability to frustrate Northern efforts to deal with 
serious environmental problems. By examining two major 
international environmental conferences, the thesis 
demonstrates both the character and limitations of this 
negative power. The foregoing study concludes that the new 
power of the South, though still quite limited today, may be 
an indication of growing strength as global environmental 
problems become increasingly central to international 
relations. 
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CHAPTER I 
CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
Introduction 
"The conflict between the North and the South, the powerful 
and the weak, has become one of the defining characteristics 
of the present international system." 1 
-Stephen Krasner 
Although Third World states lack military and economic 
strength, they still are able to exert considerable 
influence on certain international issues. The 
proliferation of small states following World War II, 
coupled with the twentieth century acceptance of the norm of 
sovereign equality, has enabled the weak states of the 
international system to challenge the order established by 
the strong. While Third World nations are weak according to 
traditional measures of power, sovereign equality and bloc 
voting by the small states, have accorded a type of 
"conditional" power to the South. 2 This conditional power 
is augmented by the advent of a new international issue, the 
environment. Because of the large population, land area, 
and natural resources of the South as a whole, it enjoys an 
unexpectedly strong negotiating position at international 
environmental conferences. The new power of the South, 
though still quite limited today, may be an indication of 
growing strength as global environmental problems become 
increasingly central to international relations. 
Most of the developing nations achieved statehood when 
the European powers relinquished their colonies following 
World War II. Although granted political autonomy, many of 
these new states suffered from a lack of size, economic 
development and political identity. This resulted in the 
creation of large numbers of small, weak nations. During 
the Cold War3 , discussions of blocs, polarization, and 
military power dominated world politics. Although 
international attention centered on the superpower conflict, 
Third World nations sought to refocus world concern upon the 
problems of underdevelopment. The poor called for reforms 
of the international system to make living standards more 
equitable. 4 However, due to their lack of power in world 
affairs, the developing nations had little success in 
affecting the international agenda. 
The United Nations would provide the international 
forum for Third World nations to present their problems. 5 
By consistently voting as a group, these nations caused the 
U.N. to increasingly focus on the subject of development. 6 
The structure of the United Nations exemplifies the tension 
between conflicting norms in the twentieth century. Great 
Power primacy is epitomized in the Security Council and the 
rights of its permanent members. The "democratic" nature of 
the General Assembly embodies the notion of sovereign 
equality. 
Because of the importance of Third World actions on 
environmental matters, the increased influence of the South 
is especially evident in environmental negotiations. Issues 
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such as population control, poverty, and pollution can only 
be addressed through global cooperation. 7 Because of their 
populations and natural resources, developing countries 
significantly influence these problems and therefore have 
greater leverage in environmental negotiations. 
Although the Southern nations have framed their 
argument for economic reforms along moral lines, political 
realists view the South's claim as simply a method to 
increase national power. By linking their developmental 
problems, with negotiations over environmental problems, the 
South hopes to increase their power in the international 
system. 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that because of the 
military and economic weakness of the South, it has sought 
to develop alternative sources of international strength. 
These new sources take advantage of norms and issues 
particular to twentieth century world politics. While these 
other sources thus far lack the potency of military or 
economic power, they do provide the South with a limited, 
but nonetheless important amount of influence in 
international politics. 
The first part of this thesis will deal with theories 
of power, bloc politics, sovereign equality, and 
international organizations. The latter part will trace the 
development of the new environmental power of the South at 




The hypothesis of this paper contains several 
underlying assumptions. It assumes that the international 
system, in Kenneth Waltz's terms, is "decentralized and 
anarchic."8 Waltz goes on to state that "self-help is 
necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic system."9 
In such a system, a state may ultimately rely only upon its 
own resources to ensure its well-being and satisfy its 
needs. 
A variety of needs must be satisfied to ensure the 
well-being of states, some needs being more basic than 
others. "Survival is the primary goal of all states, and in 
the worst situations, force is ultimately necessary to 
guarantee survival. Thus, military force is always a 
central component of national power. 1110 Security from 
external military threat is the most fundamental need of any 
state in an anarchic system. However, satisfaction of this 
need usually results in another need assuming primary 
importance. 
Richard Rosecrance differentiates between three classes 
of international objectives for a state: material, 
ideological, and security. Material goals include the 
acquisition of territory, and economic security. 
Ideological objectives refer to the state's protection of 
its central beliefs, while security goals allude to the 
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continued existence of the state. Employing the image of an 
onion, Rosecrance ranks the importance of each goal: 
.. the three international objectives . 
material, ideological, and security-constitute a 
hierarchy in importance and centrality. Material 
objectives are most peripheral and least important. 
Ideological objectives are more important than material 
goals. Under most conditions, protection of a regime's 
ideology is considered more important than the 
acquisition of new territory. Still more important 
than any ideological objective, however, is the 
overriding goal of state security. If objectives are 
ranked in this order, it becomes possible to think of 
an onion of international objectives, with an outer 
layer of material goals, an inner layer of ideological 
goals, and a core of security. Security, the most 
fundamental goal, is sought at the expense of other 
objectives. 11 
Rosecrance goes on to write that as the state meets its 
core objectives, the other objectives rise in importance. 
That is, when security is no longer threatened, ideological 
objectives become the primary goal of the state. If a state 
attains both its security and ideological objectives, it 
will seek to improve its material welfare - either through 
territorial acquisition or economic means. Furthermore, if 
two goals are in conflict, such as economic well-being and 
security, the state will always satisfy the more central 
need. Until the most basic need, the need to survive, is 
met, it will necessarily dominate all others. 12 
Although the security objective and military power have 
historically been the primary concern of nations, a number 
of authors believe that economics is assuming increasing 
importance in the twentieth century. 13 According to this 
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view, Rosecrance's onion is growing smaller as the distance 
between the core and outer skin decreases. 
During the Cold War, the security objective assumed 
paramount importance. The ideological objective, while also 
present, was of secondary importance. The East-West axis 
demarcated the major division in world politics during the 
Cold War. By the time of its end, the dynamics of world 
politics would change with the fragmentation of the East-
West blocs and the rising importance of economics as an 
international objective. The economic division between rich 
and poor, North and South, had begun to assume greater 
significance. 
Power 
In the anarchic international system, nations compete 
with other nations to attain the international objectives of 
security, ideology, and material. A nation's power 
determines how successful it will be in this pursuit. 
Strong nations will cope best in a world governed by the 
rule of self-help; weak states will be at risk in an 
international system that is based on power politics and 
free-market economics. 
The question is, what is power and how can it be 
measured? This question is frequently approached from two 
directions. Power is defined according to its effect or it 
is operationalized as certain physical attributes. Robert 
Keohane writes that any definition of power should clearly 
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distinguish between power as the ability to influence 
others' behavior, and power as a measurable resource14 • 
A number of authors have defined power as the ability 
to influence. John Spanier states that "Power is the 
capacity to impel the behavior of others in accordance with 
one's own objectives. "15 Additionally he also distinguishes 
between perceived and actual power, and between the power to 
prevent (negative power) and the power to compel (positive 
power) . 16 Marshall Singer describes it as 'the ability to 
exercise influence and the ability to prevent influence from 
being exercised over oneself. '17 According to Kenneth 
Waltz, power is the ability to affect others more than be 
affected by them. 18 
Two of these definitions are particularly applicable 
for the purposes of this thesis: power as the ability to 
affect others, and power as the ability to prevent, i.e., 
negative power. Unlike more powerful states, Southern 
states cannot buffer themselves from the turbulence of the 
international system19 • Their low level of economic 
development leaves them vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
the international economy. Lacking the military or economic 
power to threaten, the South makes use of a more limited 
form of power, the power to prevent. 
However, there is a difficulty with these sorts of 
definitions. Such definitions are useful to determine power 
only after the influence has been exerted; they cannot help 
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predict outcomes. A definition based on measurable 
resources is often a better predictor of outcomes. 
A definition of power is much easier to arrive at than 
that "old bogy--the measurement of national power."20 There 
is considerable disagreement among authors as to what 
provides an accurate assessment of national power. Many 
authors claim that power can be accurately measured by the 
empirical attributes of a state. David Garnham, in studying 
violence in the international system, chose to create a 
power index based on national attributes: geographical area, 
population, gross national product, electrical power 
generation, military force levels, and defense expenditures. 
Bruce Russett and Charles Taylor/Michael Hudson employed 
some subset of these variables in their studies. 21 
Jeffrey Hart writes that most national power rankings 
rely on the measurement of physical attributes.~ While 
these attributes have the distinct advantage of being easily 
quantifiable, he points out some disadvantages of this 
technique: 1) Actors may not always be able to take 
advantage of these resources, 2) Different conflicts require 
different types of resources, 3) Some resources such as will 
to fight are not easily quantifiable, and 4) the focus on 
the state level ignores coalitions of states, and nonstate 
actors. 23 
To overcome some of these problems, political 
scientists have suggested differing alternatives. Michael 
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Ward and Lewis House claim that their method, "behavioral 
power, " 24 is more accurate than the measurement of 
attributes or capabilities. With this method, the reactions 
of other nations to a given state's behavior determine the 
"situational power." However, this method has several 
disadvantages. It is more subjective, the rankings change 
rapidly with events, and are useful only after the fact. 
Contrary to the criticisms of Ward and House, Michael 
Sullivan claims that although measurement of physical 
resources may be inaccurate in some short-term situations, 
"traditional measures of power ... are likely to reflect 
the changes in these nations' power levels. " 25 
Perhaps Hans Morgenthau is correct when he posits that 
"the task of assessing the relative power of nations for the 
present and for the future resolves itself into a series of 
hunches. 1126 However, although there may be some inaccuracy 
in measuring power by physical attributes, it does provide a 
more objective analysis. Perhaps power is best measured 
through a combination of the intuitive (definitions) and the 
observable (physical attributes). 
There are different types of power in the international 
system, military and economic power being two of the most 
commonly used. Rosecrance's material objective reflects the 
desire for economic well-being; his security objective 
reveals the need for security from external military threat. 
Nations attain these international objectives through the 
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use of national power, which itself can be viewed along 
military or economic lines. However, it is not necessarily 
true that economic power pursues economic ends while 
military power pursues military ends. Waltz writes that 
"The distinction frequently drawn between matters of high 
and low politics is misplaced. States use economic means 
for military and political ends, and military and political 
means for the achievement of economic interests. " 27 
Just as Waltz disparages the traditional subordination 
of economics to security, Thompson and Rapkin argue that 
economic power may be more significant today than military 
power. While this view may be too extreme, it does help 
point out the increasing importance of conflicts arising out 
of economics rather than security. 
Military power has been the most salient value in the 
global system for some time. Its closest rival is 
economic power. . . . However, the global system's 
value hierarchy currently appears to be undergoing 
substantial change which may result in economic power 
becoming more important than military power. 28 
The increased salience of economics underscores the 
significance of the struggle between North and South. 
Although the dispute between the developed and developing 
nations is primarily of an economic nature (i.e., it 
involves the economic objective), it would be a mistake to 
develop power rankings based solely on economic resources. 
Military power aids in the pursuit of the economic 
objective. 
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For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to rank 
states according to two national attributes: military 
expenditures and gross national product. Although these two 
indicators are gross measures of power, they serve the 
purpose here as well as more discriminating ones. In 
selecting these attributes I hope to measure two independent 
elements of power in the international system. 
Rankings of national power based on measurable 
attributes usually include some gauge of military power. 
George Modelski writes that military expenditure "serves as 
a rough gauge of relative military power, hence also ... 
consequent international standing.''~ This was of 
particular importance in assessments of the East-West 
conflict. 
Two of the most common measures of military power are 
military force level and military expenditure. Military 
force level is a poor gauge since it fails to capture 
training or modernization of equipment. On the other hand, 
total annual military expenditure is one of the best single 
indices of military power in the international system.~ 
The second attribute, gross national product, is one of 
the best single indicators of national power. 31 It is 
included here as a measure of the total wealth of a nation 
and accordingly, its influence in the global economic 
system. Russett cites several studies showing that energy 
consumption is highly correlated with GNP and yet is 
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superior because of the common unit of measure. 32 For the 
purpose of producing a gross ranking of power, however, GNP 
is sufficiently accurate. 
In calculating this power index, I ranked each nation 
according to a single criterion, and then summed the two 
rankings of each state The states were then ranked 
according to this new power index. This method is similar 
to that used by Taylor and Hudson. 33 While a more 
sophisticated method could probably have generated interval 
rather than ordinal data, this is unnecessary since I only 
need to create a relative ranking of national power. These 
power rankings measure traditional sources of power --
military and economic resources. 
The North-South conflict is of ten characterized as the 
weak vs. the strong; the ranking produced with these two 
attributes will aid in analyzing power differentials in this 
struggle. The gross power ranking also highlights the 
differing role of power in the East-West and North-South 
conflicts. 
The results of this power assessment are in Table 1 at 
the end of this chapter. The year 1964 was chosen because 
it is the date of the first UNCTAD conference, and therefore 
is of ten chosen to mark the start of the North-South 
conflict. 
Table 1 reveals a fundamental difference between the 
East-West conflict and the North-South one. The nations of 
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East (Warsaw Pact) and West (NATO) are clustered together in 
the top quartile of the power ranking. They represent two 
militarily/economically powerful groups of countries vying 
for dominance of the international system. The countries of 
the North~, while not actually a clearly defined group, 
consist of the top quartile of nations. The nations of the 
South are of ten identified by their membership in the Group 
of 77 organization35 • They comprise the bulk of the lower 
three quartiles of the list. Whereas East vs. West can be 
seen as the battle of the strong against the strong, North 
vs. South is the battle of the strong vs. the weak. 
Table 2, below, illustrates the disparity between North 
and South. The 28 industrialized nations account for 83 
percent of world GNP, while 75 developing nations account 
for only 11 percent. These total GNP figures reflect the 
complete economic dominance of the developed nations. 
TABLE 2 
WORLD GNP FIGURES~ 
Developed Nations (28 nations) 
Developing Nations (75 nations) 
Other Nations 
Millions Percent 
of $ of Total 
1,586,084 83% 
208,530 11 % 
118,626 6% 
Table 1 ranks nations according to traditional bases of 
power. It is the supposition of this paper that the 
appearance of new norms and issues in the twentieth century 
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has created the opportunity for states to develop other 
bases of power. The South's weakness precludes it from 
challenging the North either militarily or economically. 
However, the doctrine of sovereign equality presents a new 
battlefield - the international organization. It is here 
that the drama of North vs. South is played out. 
The Theory of 
Blocs and Alliances 
One of the new types of power of the twentieth century, 
sovereign equality, is only effective if nations 
consistently vote as a group in international organizations. 
Before this paper goes on to explore the question of the 
North-South blocs, the concept of 'bloc' should be examined. 
Much of the literature on blocs and alliances describes the 
East-West situation. The question is, to what degree do 
these concepts apply to the North-South confrontation? 
Blocs and alliances are terms used by political 
scientists to distinguish between two different types of 
interstate behavior. In understanding how these concepts 
are commonly used, a better understanding of phenomena such 
as the North-South struggle, may be obtained. 
The expression, bloc, is probably best explained by 
distinguishing it from the term alliance. While not all 
authors share the definitions used here, they will serve as 
a common point of reference for this paper. Both terms, 
alliance and bloc, refer to a grouping of states in pursuit 
of common interests. The word alliance typically describes 
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a coalition based on common military goals, while a bloc may 
form around other issues such as trade, development, or 
environment. 37 
Blocs and alliances may be distinguished by the 
fluidity of their memberships. Alliances are more temporary 
than blocs because they are based on the short-term 
interests of the individual states. If and when an alliance 
is no longer in the interest of a given state, that state 
will withdraw from the coalition. Morton Kaplan believes 
that the formation of shifting alliances had helped to 
maintain the stability and peace of the international 
system.~ These shifting alliances characterized the pre-
World War I system that Kaplan referred to as the Balance of 
Power system. 39 
Unlike membership in alliances, bloc membership is more 
permanent.~ Blocs are bound together unconditionally, 
ostensibly by some common concept such as ideology. In a 
system composed of blocs, "groupings will depend upon long-
range rather than upon short-term interests. " 41 
Because of their rigidity, blocs may fail to reflect 
the differing interests of their members. Robert Rothstein 
writes that membership patterns emphasize "bloc solidarity 
even at the cost of national interests. " 42 Blocs are not 
natural phenomenon in an anarchic political system. They do 
not always allow sovereign states to act in their own best 
interests and therefore are most likely to exist only when 
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states perceive the core objective of security to be 
threatened. 
The Historical Development 
of Blocs 
The development of political blocs is a twentieth 
century phenomenon. International relations based on 
balance of power politics precludes the existence of blocs; 
in a balance of power situation, states will temporarily 
align with other states according to their interests at a 
given time. 
The flexible nature of pre-World War I international 
politics was commonly thought to have maintained peace. 43 
But the recurrence of another world war discredited balance-
of-power politics as a source of international stability. 
Following the war, international politics based on ideology 
replaced balance of power politics. Richard Rosecrance 
writes: "The notion that international politics could not be 
conducted on balance-of-power assumptions comported well 
with the ideological character of the post-World War II 
age."44 
In an ideological battle, each side is implacably 
opposed to the other and that for which it stands; the fixed 
nature of blocs renders balance of power politics 
inoperable. Thus, the ability to create a multipolar 
balance of power by creating coalitions of states, ended 
with the emergence of two superpowers following World War 
II~~ 
16 
The burdens of the Second World War exacted a heavy 
toll on the European powers. The multipolar world that they 
had dominated was at an end. Their need for colonial 
resources during World War II and their weakness after the 
war, encouraged colonial demands for an end to European 
rule. The U.S. favored decolonization and self-
determination, and feared that stifled liberation movements 
could fall under Communist influence.~ It pressured its 
allies to at least institute reforms in their colonial 
empires. 
The turbulence of decolonization created an opportunity 
for the superpowers to convert nations to their bloc. Paul 
Kennedy refers to this worldwide division into East and West 
as the "steady, lateral escalation from Europe itself into 
the rest of the world. " 47 As bloc members interacted more 
with fellow members than members of the rival bloc, the 
blocs came to be self-contained. 
Accompanying the appearance of the cold war was the 
division of the world into two hostile camps separated 
by an ideological divide . . . [that] conflict was not 
mitigated by any other cleavages cutting across the 
line dividing the two blocs. Thus the conflict was 
severe, and the use of shifting alliances to redress 
imbalances of power between coalitions was no longer 
possible. Some people used the term "bipolarity" to 
characterize the situation.~ 
Although lesser powers could not affect power dynamics, 
they felt the need to choose sides in the struggle, and the 
superpowers sought to increase the number of nations in 
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their respective blocs. In 1968 at the height of the Cold 
War, Robert Rothstein wrote, "Small Powers are now sought as 
symbols of victory in a political struggle which is never 
destined to erupt into Great Power conflict.''~ During the 
superpower struggle, victories were won when a nation chose 
to align with one bloc or the other. 
The blocs that developed in the Cold War era reflected 
two rival military/economic centers, each predominantly 
self-contained. Each saw the other as a threat to their 
ideological and core security objectives. Faced with a 
threat to their core objectives, member nations sometimes 
sacrificed individual interests for the sake of the bloc. 
The concepts of blocs and alliances as used during the 
Cold War, do not apply to the North-South groupings. These 
groups are not alliances. They lack any military nature, 
and the Third World has existed too long to be characterized 
as a short-term coalition. While the North and South are 
commonly referred to as blocs, they are not blocs like those 
of the East and West. Although they have a semi-permanent 
aspect, the North-South blocs lack the solidarity that 
distinguished the East-West blocs. 
Bloc behavior can be seen in terms of Rosecrance's 
onion theory. The members accepted the leadership of the 
hegemon because of the threat to their innermost objective -
security. In the case of North vs. South, neither side 
feels its existence threatened. The East-West contest, in 
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addition to the security threat, involved an ideological 
threat. Each bloc sought to maintain their core ideologies 
(Communism and capitalism) in the face of an external 
threat. 
The ideological struggle is less clearly defined in the 
North-South debate. Dependency Theory,~ adopted by the 
South, is not an ideology in the sense of capitalism (the 
West) or Communism (the East). The theory does not 
constitute an integral part of the South's existence. While 
Dependency Theory does call for major reforms of the free 
market system, the South lacks the power to change the 
system itself and the North largely rejected the reforms as 
unworkable or undesirable. 51 
In the absence of security or ideological causes, the 
North-South struggle occurs at the material-economic level. 
Because material interests are less central to a state's 
interests, they are unlikely to result in the creation of 
cohesive blocs. Nations are less inclined to sacrifice 
their own interests for the greater good of the bloc without 
a threat to their military security. 
Rather than speak of the South as an alliance or bloc, 
Marc Williams describes it as a pressure group. He writes 
that pressure groups are relatively new in the international 
system. 
A pressure group can be thought of as a collection of 
states (individuals etc.) applying pressure as a 
political device to secure a change (or the maintenance 
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of the status quo) on a particular set of issues. In 
this respect the G77 is a pressure group exerting 
pressure for the reform of the international economic 
system, the creation of new international regimes and 
the transfer of resources from rich states to poor 
ones.~ 
North and South behave more like pressure groups than 
the military/economic blocs that characterized the Cold War. 
If they can be considered any kind of bloc, they are a 
voting bloc. Voting blocs are more transitory and may 
change according to the issue. Military blocs enhance the 
power of their members due to their additive nature. In 
just the same way, voting blocs increase the power of member 
nations. In a world that accepts sovereign equality, the 
combined voting strength of the Third World nations, 
provides them with a limited and conditional sort of power. 
Of course, powerful states may also vote in blocs although 
there is somewhat less need to do so. By their nature, 
powerful states have power resources in addition to voting 
strength and may choose to rely on these more traditional 
bases to achieve their ends. 
Polarity and Polarization 
The terms bipolarity and bipolarization have been used 
to describe the structure of the international system 
following World War II. Although often used 
interchangeably, William Thompson and David Rapkin make a 
useful distinction between the concepts: "the fundamental 
problem with previous treatments of polarity and 
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polarization has been the failure to differentiate a 
system's distribution of power (polarity) from the tendency 
of actors to cluster around the most powerful states in the 
system (polarization) . ns3 
This differentiation is needed to describe two 
different aspects of a system dominated by a pair of states. 
Polarity refers to the number of different poles or powerful 
states in the system.~ Therefore, bipolarity refers to a 
world with two dominant states; multipolarity implies at 
least three. Because the appearance of two world hegemons 
and the formation of two rival blocs occurred nearly 
concurrently, there is some confusion as to which represents 
the cause of bipolarity. Both Kenneth and Morton Kaplan 
argue that it is the presence of predominant powers that 
creates polarity, not the clustering ~f nations. Blocs of 
nations may or may not be formed about the superpowers.ss 
Polarity can be established by studying the number of 
states in the system and the types of alliances that they 
form. Polarization is somewhat more difficult and different 
authors have suggested various ways to assess it. 
Thompson and Rapkin claim that polarization describes 
"the direction and magnitude of the interactions among polar 
and nonpolar units."56 After studying the literature, they 
claim that there are three different ways to measure 
polarization: the number of bonds, the number of 
transactions, or the type of interaction. s7 
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Measurement by bonds assesses the number of long-
lasting relationships (alliances, diplomatic exchanges, and 
IGO membership) within a bloc and compares this number with 
that between blocs. Measurement by transactions assesses 
polarization in terms of the amount of trade and financial 
aid flowing between countries. Measurement by the degree of 
interaction evaluates the degree and type of interaction 
among states, the greater the polarization of the system, 
the greater the intrabloc interaction (and the less 
interbloc interaction).~ 
Polarity, as defined earlier, is based on the number of 
dominant states in the system. Given the fact that the 
South lacks a hegemon~, according to this definition, it 
cannot be a pole, and the North-South division cannot be a 
bipolar one. In the absence of polarity, the concept of 
polarization makes less sense. The three types of 
measurement for polarization (bond, transaction, and 
interaction) were designed for a world polarized between two 
near equals. They are oriented toward the conventional 
measures of power - military and economic. 
All three are poor measures of polarization in the 
North-South conflict because of the inequality of the two 
sides. Polarization is characterized by increased intrabloc 
and decreased interbloc activity. However, the wealth and 
the military power of the North dictates that most 
interstate relationships are North-North and North-South, 
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fewer are South-South. Because of the South's economic 
dependence upon the North, the South lacks the sort of self-
contained bloc activity that was characteristic of 
polarization.~ Just as North and South cannot qualify as 
blocs in the Cold War sense, neither do they describe a 
bipolar or a polarized world. 
Morton Kaplan: 
Great Power Primacy and Sovereign Equality 
One of the most interesting and thoroughly developed 
theories concerning alliances, blocs, and polarity is the 
work of Morton Kaplan. 61 He formulates a theory of six 
different distributions of power in the international 
system. These different models depict power distributions 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as 
potential distributions in the future. 
In his discussions of multipolar and bipolar worlds, 
the system operates according to the politics of Great Power 
primacy. The Multipolar, Tight Bipolar, and Loose Bipolar 
systems of Kaplan are Realist views of the international 
system. They recognize the anarchy and self-help aspect of 
the international system. Accordingly, the only players of 
note are the powerful nations, what Kaplan describes as his 
"essential actors" and "bloc leaders." 
The Universal system that Kaplan describes, operates 
according to sovereign equality. In this system, a United 
Nations-like organization has evolved to a sufficient degree 
that it may impose formal rules upon the international 
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system, ending its anarchic character. International law 
serves as a stronger force in this system. Such a system is 
the antithesis of Great Power primacy politics and would be 
highly favored by weaker nations. It works for the 
improvement of the poorer nations at the expense of the 
richer. 62 This is the very platform advocated by the South 
in its efforts to achieve greater equity in the system. 
Kaplan's models of Great Power primacy and sovereign 
equality depict one of the recurrent tensions of the North-
South conf rontation--the question as to who gets to make up 
the rules of the game. 
This chapter has sought to depict how the concepts and 
notions of the 'other' hemispheric confrontation (East vs. 
West) fail to apply to the North-South encounter. Unlike 
the East-West dispute, North and South lack hegemons and the 
discipline they impose on blocs. East and West each 
perceived themselves to be striving for their security and 
ideological objectives; the struggle between the developed 
and developing worlds concerns the material objective. The 
Cold War pitted the strongest militaries and economies of 
the world against one another. The battle between North and 
South has the weakest nations challenging the strongest. 
This power differential dictates that the confrontation 
between North and South takes place at international 
organizations and conferences. It is made possible due to 
24 
the twentieth century acceptance of the norm of sovereign 




SUMMED RANKING OF COUNTRIES 
AS OF 1964 
RANK COUNTRY GNP MILEXP GRP 
1 United States* 1 1 NATO 
2 Soviet Union* 2 2 WP ACT 
3 United Kingdom* 4 3 NATO 
4 West Germany* 3 6 NATO 
5 China 6 4 
6 France* 5 5 NATO 
7 Italy* 8 7 NATO 
8 Canada* 9 8 NATO 
9 India 10 9 G77 
10 Japan* 7 12 
1 1 Poland* 11 10 WP ACT 
12 Czechoslovakia* 14 1 1 WP ACT 
1 3 East Germany* 13 14 WP ACT 
14 Australia* 12 16 
1 5 Sweden* 17 13 
16 Netherlands* 18 1 5 NATO 
17 Spain 16 17 
1 8 Brazil 21 18 G77 
19 Belgium* 20 19 NATO 
20 Yugoslavia 22 20 G77 
21 Argentina 19 25 G77 
22 Switzerland* 23 26 
23 Turkey 29 21 
24 Hungary* 26 24 WP ACT 
25 Rumania* 24 27 WP ACT 
26 Pakistan 25 31 G77 
27 Denmark* 27 33 
28 Mexico 1 5 46 G77 
29 Bulgaria 33 34 WP ACT 
30 Israel 45 23 
31 United Arab Republic 42 28 G77 
32 Norway* 32 38 
33 Iran 36 36 G77 
34 Austria* 28 45 
35 Venezuela 30 44 G77 
36 Chile 34 43 G77 
37 Greece 37 41 
38 North Korea 51 29 
39 Indonesia 38 42 G77 
40 Finland* 31 51 
41 Portugal 46 37 
42 South Vietnam 55 32 
43 Cuba 47 40 
44 North Vietnam 60 30 
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SUMMED RANKING OF COUNTRIES 
AS OF 1964 
SUMRANK COUNTRY GNP MILEXP GRP 
45 South Africa* 69 22 
46 Colombia 35 56 G77 
47 Iraq 57 35 G77 
48 Taiwan 53 39 
49 Peru 43 50 G77 
50 New Zealand* 40 54 
51 South Korea 48 47 G77 
52 Philippines 39 58 G77 
53 Morocco 52 48 G77 
54 Thailand 44 57 G77 
55 Malaysia 49 55 G77 
56 Nigeria 41 63 G77 
57 Ireland* 50 60 
58 Burma 59 52 G77 
59 Algeria 54 59 G77 
60 Saudi Arabia 65 49 G77 
61 Ghana 56 65 
62 Syria 77 53 G77 
63 Sudan 63 67 G77 
64 Uruguay 61 69 G77 
65 Kuwait 62 72 G77 
66 Ceylon 58 76 
67 Dominican Republic 70 66 G77 
68 Ethiopia 66 70 G77 
69 Lebanon 71 68 G77 
70 Ecuador 72 71 G77 
71 Cambodia 80 64 
72 Guatemala 64 81 G77 
73 Afghanistan 68 78 G77 
74 Zaire 67 79 G77 
75 Libya 76 73 G77 
76 Albania 88 62 
77 Ivory Coast 75 82 
78 Cameroon 84 74 G77 
79 Jordan 98 61 G77 
80 Senegal 81 83 G77 
81 Kenya 73 91 G77 
82 Rhodesia 74 92 
83 El Salvador 82 86 G77 
84 Mongolia 93 77 
85 Malagasy Republic 85 87 G77 
86 Zambia 86 88 
87 Bolivia 95 80 G77 
88 Tunisia 79 96 G77 
89 Luxembourg* 89 89 
90 Jamaica 78 104 G77 
91 Paraguay 99 84 G77 
92 Yemen 101 85 G77 
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SUMMED RANKING OF COUNTRIES 
AS OF 1964 
SUMRANK COUNTRY GNP MILEXP GRP 
93 Nepal 87 99 G77 
94 Laos 112 75 G77 
95 Uganda 91 97 G77 
96 Nicaragua 96 93 
97 Tanzania 83 106 
98 Honduras 97 98 G77 
99 Cyprus 102 94 G77 
100 Mali 107 90 G77 
101 Trinidad and Tobago 90 107 G77 
102 Haiti 104 95 G77 
103 Costa Rica 94 110 G77 
104 Niger 105 100 G77 
105 Guinea 108 101 G77 
106 Panama 92 11 7 G77 
107 Upper Volta 106 108 G77 
108 Sierra Leone 103 1 1 1 G77 
109 Dahomey 110 105 
11 0 Somalia 114 102 G77 
1 1 1 Iceland* 100 11 8 
11 2 Congo, Democratic Rep 11 7 103 G77 
1 1 3 Chad 109 11 2 G77 
11 4 Togo 11 5 109 G77 
11 5 Liberia 1 1 1 11 3 G77 
11 6 Central African Rep 11 3 114 G77 
1 1 7 Mauritania 11 6 11 5 G77 
11 8 Gabon 11 8 11 6 G77 
* Indicates developed country according to ACDA 
All data except bloc membership taken from, U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure 
Time Series, 1961-1970, Computer file, (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, distributor, 197?[~]). 
Group of 77 membership data from Karl P. Sauvant, The Group 
of 77: Evolution. Structure. Organization, (New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1981), 103. 
NATO and Warsaw Pact membership from Jeffrey Simon, ed., 
NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, (Wash. D.C.: National 
Defense University Press: 1988), 33. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT 
OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 
The history of international relations is the history of 
the inequality of nations. As far back as the Peloponnesian 
War, power not morals, governed the relations between states . 1 
The previous chapter argued that the confrontation between 
North and South was the clash of unequals. Because of their 
weakness, the developing countries could not pursue their 
goals through military or economic means. However, the 
existence of international organizations based on the concept 
of sovereign equality offered a new type of power to weak 
nations. This chapter will investigate the theoretical 
underpinnings of the idea and the degree to which it has been 
accepted in international organizations. 
Sovereign equality, also known as equality among nations 
may mean two things: equality before the law, and equality of 
participation and responsibilities. Equality before the law 
implies that all nations are treated equally by the law. 
Equality of participation and responsibilities suggests that 
all nations, weak and strong alike, should have an equal voice 
in establishing the law and sharing its benefits and burdens. 
The idea that all subjects of the law are entitled to its 
equal protection, is a prerequisite for any system of law. 
But equality before the law in no way implies equality of 
participation. 2 While equality before the law has become a 
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norm in international law, the call for equality of 
participation stirs hot debate and goes to the heart of the 
North-South dispute. 
The idea of equality among nations is derived and yet 
distinct from the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the 
defining characteristic of statehood. It has been described 
as consisting of three main elements: "First, the sovereign 
state is a full subject of international law; second, it is 
not under the control of any other state; and third, it is in 
fact able and free to exercise a fair amount of state power."3 
As a result of the basic condition of sovereignty, states 
become members of the international community and subjects of 
international law. In contrast to sovereignty, sovereign 
equality involves the degree to which sovereign nations are 
treated equally as members of the international community. 
Background of the Theory 
Given the tremendous differences that exist between 
nations (population, land area, wealth, military, etc.), the 
idea of their equality is not in tui ti vely obvious. Given 
this, how could such a notion have developed? The theory of 
equality among states is predicated upon the idea of equality 
among men. This latter notion, based in natural law, has 
existed since antiquity. 4 
Thomas Hobbes built upon the idea that man's rights arise 
as a result of his condition in the state of nature. 5 His 
contribution to the development of sovereign equality is the 
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notion that the state itself is an individual and entitled to 
certain rights. 
For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a 
COMMONWEALTH or STATE - in Latin, CIVITAS - which is but 
an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength 
than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was 
intended, and in which the sovereignty is an artificial 
soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body ... 6 
Hobbes conceived of the state as a corporate entity entitled 
to rights and granted authority. 7 Of course, the idea of the 
state as an individual seemed particularly relevant at a time 
when sovereign princes truly personified the state. 
Samuel Pufendorf took the next step in the development of 
sovereign equality. He accepted the idea of the equality of 
men arising out of the state of nature8 • He also enlarged 
upon Hobbes' conception of the state as an individual, 
describing the state as a "compound, moral person."9 
Likening the anarchic character of international 
relations to man's existence in the state of nature, Pufendorf 
built the case for the equality of states. Both international 
relations and the state of nature are environments that lack 
any higher authority to impose order upon anarchy. Pufendorf 
concluded that a state's relationship to other states is the 
same as man's relationship to other men in the state of 
nature. 10 Since the equality of man arises out of his 
condition in the state of nature, so too, the equality of 
states arises from the anarchy of international relations. 
In a famous quotation, Emeric Vattel succinctly states 
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the doctrine of the equality of states: 
Since men are by nature equal, and their individual 
rights and obligations the same, as coming equally from 
nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be 
regarded as so many free persons living together in a 
state of nature, 11 are by nature equal and hold from 
nature the same obligations and the same rights. 
Strength or weakness, in this case, count for nothing. 
A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic 
is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful 
Kingdom. 12 
The work of writers such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Vattel 
laid the theoretical foundation for the concept of the 
equality of states. This concept would gain greater 
importance as the forces of the twentieth century brought 
nations into increasing contact with one another. 
Theory of 
International Organizations 
Due to the growing interaction between nations, there 
arose a need for a more effective way to regulate 
international relations. This need for a more permanent body 
for negotiation and administration resulted in the creation of 
international organizations. In studying these organizations, 
it is useful to understand how they differ in their functional 
orientation, and how this orientation affects their methods of 
decision-making. 
Stephen Zamora distinguishes between three functional 
roles for international organizations: recommendatory agencies 
(e.g., the General Assembly), specific subject-oriented 
agencies (e.g., the IMF), and administrative task-oriented 
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agencies (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency) . 13 This 
chapter is concerned with only the first type, the 
recommendatory agencies. 
Broad PURPOSE Narrow 
<---------------------------------------------------------> 
High POLITICS Low 
Advisory POWER Binding 
Recommendatory ORGANIZATION TYPE Ad.min. 
If one pictures a continuum based on the breadth of an 
organization's purpose, one finds that broad purpose, high 
politics agencies, such as the United Nations General 
Assembly, enjoy only advisory power. At the other extreme, 
low politics agencies with a limited, defined purpose, such as 
the International Civil Aviation Organization, may issue 
binding decisions. 14 
The ability of administrative international organizations 
to issue binding decisions runs contrary to a longstanding 
rule of international law--the principle of consent. 
According to this principle, a state cannot be bound by a 
decision of a majority of its fellows, no matter how big the 
majority, unless it has given specific consent to such a 
procedure. This precept serves as one of the primary 
distinctions between domestic and international law . 15 
Because the decisions of administrative agencies tend to be 
narrow and technical, the benefits of these actions are seen 
to outweigh the minor infringement upon states' sovereignty. 16 
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Decision-making procedures of international organizations 
are commonly classified into three categories: equalitarian, 
majoritarian, and elitist. 17 Equalitarianism represents the 
fusion of the concepts of sovereign equality and consent. 
Equalitarianism, also known as unanimity, implies that every 
nation has an equal vote and that no decision may be made 
without the consent of all nations present. Although 
unanimity represents the least infringement upon sovereignty, 
it seriously hampers organizational decision-making. 
Majoritarianism, also based on the one-nation, one vote 
principle, is modeled after domestic voting. Under this 
procedure, a majority vote is sufficient to reach a decision. 
Elitism, or weighted voting, runs contrary to the idea of 
sovereign equality. In this case, the votes of certain 
nations receive more weight than others. Powerful nations 
often prefer this method because it may more closely 
approximate the effect of power on international politics. 
Feld and Jordan discuss the variation in voting methods: 
In summarizing our discussion of voting systems, it 
appears that the more technical or perhaps low politics 
the issue areas in which an IGO is concerned, the greater 
the chances that simple majorities are employed for the 
approval of decisions. Conversely, the more high 
politics are involved in particular decision making with 
IGOs, the greater is the tendency to insist on unanimity 
in voting. In this way, it is not likely that perceived 
vital interests of member-states may be adversely 
affected. 18 
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The History of 
International Organizations 
In the realm of high politics, the norm of sovereignty 
has of ten necessitated that either binding decisions be 
unanimous or majoritarian decisions be recommendatory. The 
method for making decisions, and the legitimacy of the 
decisions themselves have undergone an evolutionary process 
that can be traced back to the Congress of Vienna. As 
demonstrated by this case, the norm of sovereign equality was 
even less accepted at that time than it is today. Shortly 
after Vattel wrote that "the dwarf is as much a man as the 
giant, " 19 the giants demonstrated the difference that size can 
make. 
Subsequent to their victory over Napoleon, the powerful 
nations of Europe issued a call to strong and weak alike to 
attend the Congress of Vienna in order to decide the fate of 
continent. Although the call for such a conference nominally 
adhered to the notion of equality, in truth, "After the defeat 
of Napoleon, in the spring of 1 81 4, the principal allied 
powers assumed the task of restoring the peace and order in 
Europe. At the Congress of Vienna, the four most powerful 
states assumed the responsibility for European 
security." 20 During the proceedings of the Congress, and of 
subsequent international organizations, a tension has existed 
concerning decision-making. Based on the principle of 
sovereign equality, weaker states have claimed an equal right 
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in the decision process. Stronger states, on the contrary, 
prefer that those responsible for implementing a decision have 
the greatest say in making it. Decisions based on sovereign 
equality tend to carry greater moral authority, yet decisions 
made contrary to the wishes of the Great Powers, 21 are 
unlikely to be implemented. 
Just as they had after the Napoleonic Wars, the 
victorious nations of World War I, called for an international 
conference to prevent the recurrence of cataclysmic war. 
Unlike the Congress, the League of Nations was to be a 
permanent body. Although the leaders of the Great Powers, 
including Wilson, had originally envisaged an organization 
based on Great Power primacy, 22 the resultant organization 
represented a compromise between Great Power primacy and 
sovereign equality. The League was to be composed of three 
organs: the Secretariat, the Council (embodying Great Power 
primacy) and the Assembly (embodying sovereign equality) . 23 
In deference to their position, the Great Powers received five 
permanent seats on the Council of the League. 
In accordance with the concepts of sovereign equality and 
consent, every nation had one vote. The decisions of the 
League would be based on the principle of unanimity.~ Given 
the ability of the League to invoke collective security 
measures against a state~, one might at first question the 
willingness of the Great Powers to accept such a threat to 
their sovereignty. 
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However, the unanimity rule negates the formal power of 
sanctions. The Great Powers agreed to join the League because 
they could thwart its actions. "It is noteworthy that the 
League institutions have little power. . . . In so far as 
League institutions are equipped to ensure permanent peace, 
their most important powers, with a few exceptions, are of an 
advisory or ministerial character. " 26 While safeguarding the 
sovereignty of its member nations, the League's adoption of 
the unanimity rule hampered its ability to keep peace. 
The outbreak of a second World War in less than thirty 
years demonstrated the ineffectuality of the League. Even 
before the end of World War II, the allies met to discuss 
plans for a new international organization to take the place 
of the League. As they had after the last two major wars, the 
allies hoped to create an organization that would spare the 
world another global hostility. The absence of the United 
States (and later, other Great Powers) is commonly seen as a 
fundamental flaw of the League. The founders of the United 
Nations believed that Great Power participation was 
fundamental to the organization's success, and structured it 
accordingly. 27 
Although the Covenant of the League set a precedent by 
accepting sovereign equality and unanimity, the failure of the 
League demonstrated the need for changes. Political 
realities, both international and domestic, required that the 
United Nations embody a compromise between sovereign equality 
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and Great Power primacy. However, in comparison with the 
League, the Charter strengthened the hand of the Great Powers 
and made fewer concessions to sovereign equality. Like its 
predecessor the League of Nations, the two principal political 
bodies of the United Nations are a Council and an Assembly. 
The Security Council, again the bastion of Great Power 
primacy, holds permanent seats for the Great Powers. The 
General Assembly, again the embodiment of sovereign equality, 
has only hortatory powers. 
The voting in the United Nations differs in two important 
aspects from that of the League. Voting in the League, in 
both the Assembly and the Council, was based on unanimity. In 
the United Nations, voting in the Assembly is based on 
majoritarianism, while voting in the Security Council is a 
combination of maj ori tarianism and unanimity. In the Security 
Council, nonprocedural matters must gain both a majority of 
all members and the unanimous consent of all permanent 
members. The founders of the U.N. made this concession to 
Great Power primacy to ensure the participation of the 
powerful states. All but the Great Powers surrendered a 
degree of sovereignty by agreeing to accept the "majority" 
decisions of the Security Council. The Great Powers became 
the only members able to stymie the will of the Security 
Council. 28 
While the change from equalitarian to majoritarian voting 
was intended to increase the effectiveness of the 
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organization, the new design enjoyed questionable success 
during the forty odd years of the Cold War. The requirement 
for unanimity among the Great Powers, predicated the success 
of the United Nations upon cooperation among them. 
The unity of the great powers is the core of the 
peacekeeping plan. The framers reasoned that as long as 
the great powers remained united in their desire to 
maintain peace and security . . . no other power or 
group of powers could stand against them. The Council's 
role was regarded by its architects as both natural and 
realistic, since World War II had reaffirmed the premise 
that war-making, and hence peacekeeping, is largely a 
great power choice.~ 
The outbreak of the Cold War quickly dashed the hopes for 
Great Power consensus.~ Just as the unanimity rule and the 
lack of consensus had paralyzed the League, so too, the Great 
Power unanimity rule and the absence of Great Power agreement, 
prevented the United Nations from fully realizing the dreams 
of its founders. 
Summary 
The change from unanimous to majoritarian voting had 
limited success in alleviating the paralysis that had plagued 
the League. But the chronic weakness of high politics 
international organizations is less a function of internal 
procedures than of the nature of international politics. The 
notion of an international authority is antithetical to 
sovereignty, upon which the nation-state system is based. 
The tension between Great Power primacy and sovereign 
equality reflects the struggle for power in the international 
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system. Those nations unable to assert themselves militarily 
or economically, seek power in the concept of equality among 
nations. The debate hinges on the question of whether this 
should simply be equality before the law or equality of 
participation. 
If today we are to find in the United Nations the 
principal institutional expression of the demand for 
greater equality, we must do so in terms of what the 
organization has become and not in terms of what it was 
initially intended to be. The change from an instrument 
of the great powers to a forum in which the new states 
could press their claims begins in the late 1950s and 
coincides with events that suddenly gave the weak of the 
world unexpected significance. 31 
One of these events would be the emergence of the Third World. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTH 
Postwar Changes 
The emergence of the Third World after the end of World 
War II can be traced to changes in three areas: the 
international power balance, the monetary/trading regimes, and 
the colonial empires of the Great Powers. These changes would 
result in the creation of a large number of weak states, and 
these states would feel that the international political and 
economic systems worked against their interests. Militarily 
and economically weak, these states found a sense of common 
identity in their rejection of superpower politics and their 
call for reforms of the international economic system. 
Eventually these small, weak states would challenge the 
international economic regime of the strong, and foment the 
North-South conflict. 
The first change in the system, the transformation of the 
international power balance, reduced the number of Great 
Powers to two, now termed superpowers. Except for the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the war had seriously weakened 
the powerful nations of the world. Prior to the conflict, the 
international system had been characterized by a "balance of 
power, " shifting alliances, and the existence of Great Powers. 
After the war these features were replaced by bipolarity, 
military/economic blocs, and superpowers. The war had 
established the United States as the premier economic power of 
the world. 1 This transformation of the international power 
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structure would be reflected in the second area of change -
the international economic regimes. 
Events leading up to the war and the war itself, had 
damaged the international monetary and trading regimes. 
Hegemonic Stability Theory asserts that international 
cooperation is most easily created and maintained in the 
presence of a hegemon. 2 Britain had served in this role 
until the decline of British power in the 1930s. In the 
absence of a hegemon, the world economic system degenerated 
into economic warfare. Domestic concerns and nationalistic 
tendencies triumphed over international cooperation. 3 
From its postwar position of "unchallenged hegemonic 
leadership,"4 the United States asserted its power to 
establish new regimes in the areas of money and trade. The 
United States, and to a lesser extent, Great Britain, took the 
lead in formulating a liberal economic order at Bretton Woods 
in 1943. This eventually resulted in the creation of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the 
World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. 5 The IMF, 
the World Bank, (and later GATT,) were oriented around the 
problems of the industrialized nations. 6 
"The Bretton Woods institutions had never been joined by 
the third great international economic agency envisaged in the 
planning for the postwar period--the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). " 7 This third organization, the ITO, would 
have had a greater orientation toward the concerns of the 
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developing countries. When the industrialized countries 
rejected the plan for the ITO, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade arose in its place. "The underlying 
principle of GATT--reciprocity and bargaining in a quid pro 
quo situation--made its actions dependent on the big trading 
nations. For this reason GATT produced results that were 
either injurious or not beneficial to the developing 
countries. " 8 This inattention to the needs of developing 
nations would eventually lead to Third World calls for 
reforms. 
The third area of major change following the war, was the 
end of the European colonial empires. Robert Jackson writes 
that, decolonization 
... stemmed from a rather sudden and widespread change 
of mind and mood about the international legitimacy of 
colonialism which aimed at and resulted in its abolition 
as an international institution. During and after World 
War II, colonialism became controversial and finally 
unacceptable in principle. 9 
However, in ending the "evil" of colonialism, the European 
powers created another problem. The new nations, termed 
"quasi-states"10 by Jackson, lacked the state authority, 
effective governmental organizations, and political community 
that characterized modern states. 
Because of their history as colonial states, most Third 
World nations suffer from military, economic, and political 
weakness. Set within an anarchic, international system, these 
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weak states suffer a chronic disadvantage. 
Third World states, like all states in the international 
system, are concerned about vulnerability and threat .. 
national political regimes in almost all Third World 
countries are profoundly weak both internationally and 
domestically. . . • This weakness stems from the 
inability to influence unilaterally or to adjust 
internally to the pressures of the global markets. 
Small size and inflexible domestic structures make Third 
World states vulnerable. 11 
One of the tasks of government is to buffer domestic 
affairs from the effects of a volatile international economic 
system. But this task is made more difficult in the case of 
a weak state. A weak, nonindustrial state is at great 
disadvantage in the international system. Large industrial 
states set the terms of the international economic system. 
Small industrial states while having little say 
internationally, can still adjust their domestic economies to 
the changing international scene. However, small 
nonindustrial nations have no say in the international system 
and cannot make internal adjustments to minimize the impact of 
changes . 12 
Nonalignment 
The end of the colonial empires resulted in the creation 
of small, chronically weak states. These small nonindustrial 
states found their interests largely ignored in the battle 
between the two superpowers. The Third World's economic 
problems seemed of little import to a world preoccupied by the 
superpower's threats of mutual destruction. Because East and 
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West largely ignored the plight of the developing countries, 
the Third World nations lacked a vested interest in the Cold 
War. Whether they joined one of the blocs or remained 
individual states outside of them, their weakness translated 
into a lack of influence. A third choice for the developing 
nations was the formation of a new and independent bloc. 
Rothstein sees the Third World as "repudiating the traditional 
system of international politics - a system which excluded, 
ignored, or abused them. . . . " 13 Their choice was for 
neither East nor West but nonaligned. Thus at its inception, 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was defined not in terms of the 
North-South conflict but the East-West one. 14 
Given the vast disparity of interests among developing 
nations, the formation of a Third World bloc was a difficult 
task. By defining itself in terms of its opposition rather 
than its commonality, it overcame the problem of its 
diversity. 
Although commonly referred to as the Third World, this 
group of nations is actually composed of two independent 
organizations, the NAM and the Group of 77 15 • At a conference 
in 1961, the developing nations formed the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). They sought to create a third political 
force, independent of either superpower. The Movement's 
members hoped that by forming a coalition, their agenda would 
be given more weight in international politics. During its 
first ten years, the issues of decolonization and East-West 
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tensions dominated the Movement . 16 Although the NAM failed 
to have much impact on the politics of the East-West struggle, 
the organization shifted its focus toward economic problems as 
development issues gained importance . 17 
The policy of nonalignment differs from what is commonly 
seen as a policy of neutrality. James Caporaso defines the 
concepts: 
Neutrality is the legal term referring to the status, 
rights, and responsibilities of states during armed 
hostilities. Nonalignment, on the other hand, is a term 
denoting a particular pattern of behavior or a policy 
posture adopted by a state. Holsti sees the essence of 
this policy as a refusal on the part of states "to commit 
themselves militarily to the goals and objectives of the 
major powers. " 18 
Neutrality implies a decision to withdraw from an arena of 
hostile political activity. In contrast, nonalignment, 
implies a deliberate decision to avoid choosing sides yet not 
necessarily a withdrawal from action. 
Underdevelopment 
Although much of the developing world realized political 
independence in this period, economic independence continued 
to elude them. The problem of underdevelopment seemed to be 
chronic. Three main schools of thought seek to explain the 
ongoing problem of underdevelopment: economic liberalism, the 
structuralist position, and the Marxist-radical position. 19 
Liberal economists believe that international trade 
promotes development. They assert that the division of the 
world into developed and developing nations will gradually 
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disappear as the latter become industrialized. Liberals 
believe that the problem lies in barriers to free trade that 
are erected by domestic political and social forces. The key 
to the problem lies in the lack of efficiency in domestic 
markets, not the forces of the international market. 20 
Structuralism attributes Third World poverty to the 
underlying structure of the international economic system. 
According to one of the early advocates, Gunnar Myrdal: 
Market forces will tend cumulatively to accentuate 
international inequalities, [and] a quite normal result 
of unhampered trade between two countries, of which one 
is industrial and the other underdeveloped, is the 
initiation of a cumulative process toward the 
impoverishment and stagnation of the latter. 21 
Contrary to liberal assumptions that international trade 
alleviates underdevelopment, this argument claims that the 
structure of the international marketplace reinforces it. 
Rather than lessening the gap between rich and poor, 
international trade widens it.~ The structuralists advocated 
a policy of import substitution to end underdevelopment. 
The 1960s saw the appearance of a more radical 
alternative to the structuralist argument, Dependency Theory. 
This argument agrees with structuralism that the international 
economic system worsens underdevelopment. However, Dependency 
Theory is heavily influenced by Marxism. It claims that the 
wealth of the North is directly responsible for the poverty of 
the South. The success of capitalism is based upon the 
exploitation of one group by another. 23 Furthermore, the 
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theory posits that ruling elites in developing countries have 
an interest in maintaining the inequalities of the capitalist 
system.~ Robert Gilpin writes: 
. . . the underdeveloped periphery is necessarily backward 
and underdeveloped because the periphery is 
systematically exploited and prevented from developing by 
international capitalism and its reactionary domestic 
allies in the Third World economies themselves. 25 
Prior to the Third World's adoption of an 
Underdevelopment position, poverty served as their only common 
bond. Structuralism and Dependency Theory identified the 
causes and offered solutions. They provided a common 
framework that helped build solidarity and unity. Stephen 
Krasner maintains that the adoption of a common ideology was 
key to overcoming their differences. 
The development of a coherent set of ideas . . . has 
provided the basis not simply for unity among Third World 
states but for the very idea of the Third World itself. 
Domestic and international weaknesses made 
Southern unity an immanent tendency in the post-World War 
II global order; but the actualization of that unity was 
dependent on the development of a common world view. 26 
The structuralist argument and the unity it brought to the 
Third World would be demonstrated at the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. 
UNCTAD I 
The early 1960s witnessed a confluence of forces that 
furthered the global alignment into North and South. 
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Developing nations believed that the existing trading regime, 
GATT, favored rich nations. The Third World sought a forum in 
which sovereignty, not wealth, was the basis for voting.v An 
earlier attempt to create an international trade organization 
had failed due to rejection by the North. The American 
attitude toward the conference changed due to East-West 
pressures not North-South ones. A Soviet attempt to woo the 
developing states led America to fear increased Soviet 
influence in the Third World and caused the U.S. to drop its 
objections to an international trade conference. 28 
A shift in the balance of power within the United Nations 
also precipitated the global alignment into North and South. 
The entry of 18 developing states provided the Third World 
with a majority in the General Assembly.~ If the developing 
nations could muster sufficient solidarity, they could control 
the voting there. The Third World displayed its unity on 
economic matters at a conference in Belgrade in 1961. At this 
meeting the NAM called for an international conference to 
discuss the economic problems of the developing world.~ The 
combination of the new superpower interest, the changed makeup 
of the General Assembly, and Third World solidarity resulted 
in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1707 (XVI) - the 
call for an international trade conference. 
Raul Prebisch, one of the leading advocates of Third 
World unity, served as Secretary-General to UNCTAD I. An 
early proponent of structuralism, he sought to explain the 
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Third World's underdevelopment in terms of the international 
economic system. Richard Gardner describes the impact of 
Prebisch's report: 
Even more significant than behavior at the Conference was 
the impact of Raul Prebisch's brilliant report, "Towards 
a New Trade Policy for Development." Both in its 
diagnosis and its prescriptions this document gave new 
impetus to the principal demands of the less developed 
countries. . . . One of the central concepts in the 
Prebisch report was that steadily deteriorating terms of 
trade constitute one of the principal obstacles to the 
development of the less developed countries. 31 
One of the most lasting effects of the conference 
involved the institutional question the matter of a 
continuing international trade body. The developed nations 
preferred the existing GATT~ organization and sought to 
prevent the creation of any new institution. The developing 
nations desired a new body, under U.N. auspices, in which 
voting would be based on sovereign equality, and thus give 
them a greater voice." 
Western nations agreed to the demand for a new 
organization, but sought to avoid a situation like that of the 
General Assembly, in which the developing countries had 
control by virtue of their numbers. The industrialized 
nations first proposed that the permanent group (or standing 
committee) be composed equally of developed and developing 
nations, regardless of their ratio in the United Nations. The 
next of fer by the industrialized nations insisted that 
decisions by the standing committee be approved by a majority 
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of the twelve industrialized nations present. Eventually 
North and South reached a compromise in which the developed 
nations dropped their demand to block resolutions and the 
developing nations agreed to a conciliation procedure.~ This 
negotiation over voting procedures mirrors the ongoing tension 
in international politics between Great Power primacy and 
sovereign equality. Strong nations want voting procedures to 
reflect international power; weak nations prefer procedures to 
be based on full equality among nations. 
National groupings have always played a major role in the 
United Nations and continued to do so at UNCTAD. "The 
official groupings established at the first UNCTAD meeting 
were basically regional--Afro-Asian, Latin American, advanced 
market economy, and socialist--not North-South. " 35 As nations 
jockeyed back and forth, proposing and revising resolutions, 
the conference began to resolve into North and South. 
During this formulation of voting resolutions, the 
developing nations caucused informally and drew up their own 
joint resolution. This resolution, signed by the Group of 
75~, signaled the unity of the developing nations on economic 
issues. The resolution itself highlights this fact. 
The developing countries regard their own unity, the 
unity of the seventy-five, as the outstanding feature of 
this Conference. This unity has sprung out of the fact 
that facing the basic problems of development they have 
a common interest in a new policy for international trade 
and development.n 
Although two independent Third World organizations existed, 
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their agendas differed. Whereas the NAM focused on political 
issues during these years, the Group of 77 concentrated on 
economic ones.~ 
The solidarity displayed at UNCTAD I and subsequent 
conferences is somewhat surprising considering the vast 
differences among the membership of the G75. Another barrier 
to unity had been the strength of regional ties. The Latin 
American, African, Arab, and Asian states each had their own 
regional organizations. A true Third World economic 
conference didn't occur until 1962 when Latin American 
countries joined Asian and African for the first time. 39 
The challenge mounted by the Third World during UNCTAD I 
became the opening salvo in the conflict between the North and 
the South. The conference and the Group of 75 are important 
because they mark the beginning of a unified South advocating 
a comprehensive plan for the future.~ 
The Final Act and Report issued by the conf erence41 bore 
a close resemblance to the Joint Resolution of the Group of 
75. Of course, given that group's majority and the voting 
procedures, the outcome was hardly unexpected. However, like 
the resolutions of its parent body, the General Assembly, the 
resolutions of the UNCTAD are of a symbolic not a binding 
nature. The industrialized nations preferred to accept the 
conclusions of the conference due to their limited effect. 
Without the active support of the North, Southern calls for 
reform would go unheeded. 
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UNCTAD I also marked a fundamental change in the 
international alignment among nations. 
Until the early 1960s ... developed Western countries 
were usually able to negotiate acceptable resolutions 
with "moderate" less developed countries. Al though there 
were clearly identifiable interest groups on economic 
issues, negotiations and voting did not usually take 
place on the basis of rich- and poor-countr7 blocs. With 
the advent of UNCTAD the pattern changed. 4 
UNCTAD I "was the first international conference at which the 
North-South divide appeared as a salient feature in world 
politics, obscuring and relegating the East-West conflict to 
a secondary position. " 43 The conference set the tone for the 
North-South discussions ever since. 
The North-South Divide 
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Guy Arnold, The Third World Handbook, London: Cassell Educ., 
1989, 42. 
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The New International Economic Order 
The final report issued by UNCTAD I represented the first 
coherent, comprehensive economic program articulated by the 
developing countries. Encouraged by the success of the 
conference and, later, the OPEC cartel, the South aggressively 
sought reforms in the international economic system. By 
virtue of its majority in the U.N. General Assembly, the South 
would push through resolutions~ calling for the establishment 
of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) . 
Calls by the developing nations to modify the 
international economic system predate the formal passage of 
the NIEO. Ever since the first U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development in 1964, the establishment of these reforms had 
been the primary objective of the Third World. 45 
Following the South's success in creating a permanent 
UNCTAD, developing countries viewed the formation of the OPEC 
cartel as another victory of the weak over the strong. 
The dramatic and vastly profitably seizure of control 
over petroleum by oil-producing LDC nations pointed 
toward possible supply control and price boosts for other 
commodities produced by LDCs and more broadly suggested 
possibilities for new structures of organization and 
power for the Third World.~ 
OPEC' s ability to determine the price of oil, encouraged other 
developing nations to challenge the North in a number of ways, 
including the proposal of the NIEO. 
The New International Economic Order was not the result 
of any single conference or event. Rather it represented the 
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gradual coalescence of a series of ideas into a coherent 
program. Support for this effort culminated in the passage of 
the NIEO resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1974. 47 
These sweeping resolutions called for major changes in 
the international free market system for the benefit of 
developing nations. The resolutions sought to: stabilize 
international commodity markets, increase access to industrial 
nation's markets, adjust tariffs to advantage the South, 
strengthen the sovereignty of developing states and increase 
financial aid and technology transfers to the Third World.~ 
Because the World Bank and IMF operated under weighted voting 
rules that favored the developed countries, the Third World 
also called for changes to increase their representation in 
those bodies. 49 
The extent of the gap that existed between North and 
South is illustrated in Table 1 at the end of the chapter. 
The year 1 979 was chosen because it falls midway between 
UNCTAD I and today. The thirty-four low-income countries have 
an average income of $150, while the eighteen industrialized 
nations (the West) have a per capita GNP of $6980. I. 
William Zartman writes that "The essence of the problem is 
that the two parts of the world are at different stages of 
development." 50 Although the South's U.N. majority succeeded 
in passing these resolutions, their implementation was another 
matter. The forum of the United Nations provided a pulpit 
62 
from which the South could call for reforms, but neither the 
General Assembly nor the Third World had the wherewithal to 
change the international economic system--only the North could 
do that. But as far as the North was concerned, the liberal 
economic system worked quite well. The limited voice of 
developing countries on economic matters was considered to be 
commensurate with their role in international economics. 51 
Because the reforms of the NIEO were never accepted by the 
developed nations, the NIEO has made little progress. 52 
The South sought to frame the argument for the NIEO along 
moral and humanitarian lines; it argued that the inequalities 
of the system are immoral and called for reforms to correct 
it. Yet some political scientists have questioned this moral-
sounding cry. Michael Sullivan writes that "despite much of 
the humanistic and moral tone taken by many of the Third World 
nations . . ultimately their real concern is with power, 
their current lack of power, and their desire to attain more 
power.''~ He maintains that the North-South conflict should 
be analyzed in terms of Realpolitik rather than humanitarian 
issues. 
Hans Morgenthau, one of the early twentieth century 
political realists, concurs with this view, stating that the 
causes of the disparity are much more than just the policies 
of the rich. 
Thus the terms in which the so-called North-South 
conflict is fought out between the have and the have-not 
nations of the world in good measure conceal and at the 
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same time justify a conflict between the traditionally 
powerful and the new politically weak nations whose main 
real object is exactly a new distribution of power.~ 
The South's repeated calls for an NIEO, whether motivated 
by humanitarian or realist reasons, have failed to achieve 
much change. The power of sovereign equality did enable the 
South to influence the international agenda, and at least 
enter into dialogue with the North. However, the North's 
willingness to negotiate (e.g. UNCTAD), is not the same as a 
willingness to change. 
Joan Edelman Spero writes that: "Unity and confrontation 
are effective only if the South can withhold that which the 
North wants or needs. But the South has had very little with 
which to threaten the North. " 55 Due to the military and 
economic weakness of the South, it has been unable to threaten 
the North in any way.~ The lack of any credible threat has 
prevented the South achieving its goals in the international 
system. However, as global environmental issues gained 
importance by the 1970s, this situation changed. The degree 
to which the North has perceived certain international 
environmental problems as threats, the South has gained a 
limited amount of power. The following chapter will explore 
the nature and evolution of this power during the negotiations 
to reduce ozone depletion. 
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1,190 3.4 .. • 110 
9,597 390 5.1 64 110 
29 630 4.3 70 104 
121 670 5.1 63 124 
1,565 830 0.8 63 100 
115 910 --0.4 ;; 72 B6 
238 1 ,580 8.5 9S 70 , 35 
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313 3, 150 4.1 ga 11 106 
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108 4,680 3.2 73 122 
a Figures in italics in :his :olumn refer to 1961-1970 rath~r that 1960-1970. 
b Figures in ;tal1cs 1r, this colun~n ref<:r to 1970-1976 rathE:r than 1970-1977. 
c Figurts 1n ddlics a'" tor years other th:!n 1975 See To:;chmr:.al Notes. 
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THE ROLE OF "NEGATIVE" POWER 
IN THE OZONE DEPLETION PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The solidarity and confrontational tactics employed by 
the South in the General Assembly allowed it to bring the 
issue of underdevelopment to international attention. 
However, although these tactics enabled developing nations to 
pass resolutions such as the NIEO, the weakness of Third World 
nations precluded their implementation. Although sovereign 
equality granted the Third World some control over the 
international agenda, nonbinding resolutions present no threat 
and can be ignored by the North. This inability to threaten 
is the essence of the weakness of the Third World. However, 
the situation may be changing; global environmental issues may 
be the threat that empowers the South vis a vis the North. 
Like the power of sovereign equality, the South's power 
in environmental matters is predicated upon solidarity among 
the members of the bloc. Yet, while the power of sovereign 
equality resides in the collective membership, the South's 
environmental power exists in individual member nations. For 
example, in environmental negotiations regarding rain forests, 
tropical nations such as Brazil hold the power. In 
negotiations concerning energy, OPEC member states hold it. 
International talks that center on pollution as a by-product 
of industrialization, yield power to the most populous 
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developing nations, i.e., India and China. 1 
Because this power on environmental issues resides in 
member states, it may be severely undercut by side-agreements 
between the North and individual developing nations. The 
unity of the South is vulnerable. In terms of the three types 
of goals discussed by Rosecrance, material, ideological, and 
security, 2 the goals of the South are of the material type and 
rank the lowest among state objectives. Solidarity such as 
that of the South is dependent on a nation's perception that 
its interests coincide with that of the bloc. 
International environmental problems of the late 
twentieth century are increasingly perceived as serious 
threats by large and small nations alike. In the past, 
nations dealt with environmental problems through legislation 
at the national level, or unilateral action at the 
international level. 3 However, given the global nature of 
environmental problems today, national legislation and 
unilateral international action become less and less adequate. 
Nations increasingly turn to international environmental 
diplomacy to solve problems that no one nation, even a 
superpower, can hope to solve alone. 4 
In seeking international solutions to world problems, 
nations will often group together based on common interest. 
The political and military forces of the mid-twentieth century 
caused nation-states to align into East and West. 




twentieth century have resulted in a North-South alignment. 
According to Marc Williams: 
It is widely accepted that global negotiations on the 
environment have a North-South dimension. North-South 
issues are inscribed in the international environmental 
agenda at two structural levels: in the equality of 
responsibility for environmental degradation and in the 
relative abilities to cope with these problems. 5 
North versus South 
Environment versus Development 
The environmental issue between North and South can be 
reduced to the dichotomy of environmental protection versus 
economic development. The North, having damaged the 
environment in the process of its own development, now 
proclaims the need to protect it from further degradation. 
The developed nations urge the South to avoid the same path of 
industrialization that produced a high living standard while 
harming the environment. The Third World takes the position 
that the industrialized nations are responsible for the damage 
thus far, and the mistakes of the North should not affect the 
South's development. Furthermore, without technological aid, 
and international economic reforms, "the people of the South 
will have no option but to pollute to survive."6 
In 1 968 in his seminal work, "The Tragedy of the 
Commons," Garrett Hardin employed the image of herdsmen 
keeping cattle on a commons, to explain man's tendency to 
exploit the environment in order to increase his personal 
gain. 7 In this scenario, individuals risk overgrazing the 
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commons by continuing to add cattle to their own herds. Each 
individual acts rationally, since the increase in private 
goods (well-fed cattle) benefits solely him, while the 
decrease in the public goods (the environment) is spread among 
the group. 
The North-South environment vs. development theme can be 
seen as a variation upon this scenario. In this adaptation, 
there are two groups of herdsmen on the commons. The 
individuals of the first group, realizing the advantage to be 
gained, increase the sizes of their herds; however, at some 
point their actions endanger the commons itself. The second 
group of herdsmen had at first been unable to expand their 
herds like the others, and do not share in their increased 
wealth. When they are able to add to their herds, they are 
warned by the first group that the pasture is already nearly 
overgrazed and there is not room for more cattle. The first 
group stresses the need to preserve the commons for the good 
of all. 
Similarly, the North increased its private goods through 
a process that decreased a public, though finite good--the 
ability to pollute without endangering the global environment. 
The South, now wishing to increase its own private goods by 
drawing upon that finite resource, learns that there is 
probably not enough to go around. Does the South have the 
right to pursue it own development at the risk of the commons? 
As long as the North continues to respect the sovereignty 
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of the developing nations, negotiation remains the only avenue 
through which it may inf 1 uence the behavior of the Sou th. The 
North's need to negotiate environmental solutions with the 
South, provides the developing nations "with a new source of 
leverage and bargaining power. This power is essentially 
'negative' and derives from the ability of the South to 
undermine agreements on global environmental issues. " 8 
Negative power represents a new 
politics, and results from the 
worldwide environmental problems. 
form of power in world 
increasing importance of 
Because of the natural 
resources, land area, and growing populations of the South, it 
has become a prime beneficiary of this new power. 
To illustrate both the scope and limits of this negative 
power in environmental matters, this chapter and the next will 
look at two international environmental problems and the 
conferences that sought to deal with them. This chapter will 
discuss the matter of stratospheric ozone depletion and the 
Montreal Protocol ( 1 987) • The next one will look at the 
global warming issue and the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development ( 1992). In each case, I will 
analyze the purpose of the conference, look for any issues 
that might produce a North-South alignment, and ask whether 
the South gained any real concessions from the North. 
Like the power of sovereign equality, this power is not 
quantifiable by traditional measures of power. Instead, it is 
a function of the increasing importance of environmental 
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problems. This paper hopes to show that such concessions 
evidence the negative power of the South. Furthermore, this 
power w~ll only be operative in situations in which three 
requirements are met: the North must perceive a serious 
threat to itself, the South must have influence over that 
threat, and the South must maintain solidarity in the course 
of negotiations. 
Background to the Montreal Protocol 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
The groundwork for the Third World's efforts at Montreal, 
was laid back in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. There, eight 
years after the first meeting of UNCTAD in 1964, and two years 
prior to the passage of the NIEO, the world would meet to 
discuss the worsening problems of pollution. The result of 
the conference, the Stockholm Declaration, would establish the 
need for differential treatment of developing nations on 
environmental matters. Differential treatment for developing 
states would become an integral part of the Montreal Protocol. 
Although some argued that developing nations should be 
excluded from a worldwide conference on the environment, the 
U.N. auspices of this conference ensured participation by the 
South. 9 U.N. sponsorship again proved key to the South, when 
it used its voting strength in the General Assembly to link 
the issues of the environment and development. 10 A 
preconference committee issued the so-called Founex Report 11 
stating that environmental problems were the result of both 
poverty and industrialization. This overt recognition of the 
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necessity to link environment and development represented a 
change from the past. "The Founex Report marked the turning 
point in the definition of the international environmental 
problem. " 12 
The nations of the South believed that the push to solve 
environmental problems could seriously affect their ability to 
become more developed. They made this issue an integral part 
of the discussions before and during the Stockholm talks . 13 
Developing nations believed that environmental problems could 
not be addressed independent of development problems. An 
Indian representative at Stockholm stated, "To the majority in 
these countries, 'environment' is a term that stands for a mud 
hut providing inadequate shelter against the elements . 
Economic development for us is thus not the cause of 
environmental inadequacies but the cure. " 14 
The conference issued the Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment. Principle 21 of this document expressed 
the South's concern that their development not be impeded. 
According to it, states have the right to exploit their own 
resources as long as they do not cause damage to another 
state. 15 This point strikes a balance between the sovereign 
right to exploit one's own resources and the sovereign right 
not to be harmed by another state's action. 
Another point on the South's agenda that was successfully 
incorporated into the Declaration is embodied in Principle 23. 
Developing nations had argued that it would be inequitable to 
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apply environmental treaties equally to every country. 
Developed nations are more guilty of causing the problem, and 
compliance is a greater hardship on developing countries. 
This principle states that " ... it will be essential in all 
cases to consider ... the applicability of standards which 
are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the 
developing countries. " 16 
The language of Principle · 23 differed from all prior 
international environmental accords in that it specifically 
distinguished between the obligations of developed and 
developing countries. "There are no instances of conventional 
environmental norms or generally known environmental 
aspirations that provided differential treatment prior to 
Principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment. " 17 This principle of differential norms is found 
in many treaties written since Stockholm, in particular, the 
Montreal Protocol. 
The only reason that the developed nations agreed to 
these principles is that the Stockholm Declaration is just 
that, a declaration and not a legally binding treaty. Since 
this type of document is not "hard" law, it has been referred 
to as "soft settlement" . 18 There are those that argue that in 
this case soft settlement did in fact become international 
law. "The general acceptability of those norms by the 
international community, and especially their translation into 
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national laws and subsequent treaties, makes tenable the 
argument that the prescriptions of the Stockholm Declaration 
are customary rules of international law. " 19 
Declarations, such as the one at Stockholm, may serve as 
"signposts on the way to customs and treaties."20 By 
accepting the idea of differential treatment, the UNCHE 
established a precedent for future global environmental 
negotiations. The Montreal Protocol adopted the notion of 
differential treatment, and codified it into international 
law. 
The Problem of Ozone Depletion 
The Montreal Protocol serves as the best illustration of 
a subsequent environmental treaty providing special treatment 
for developing countries. 21 This treaty, intended to reduce 
ozone depletion, provided developing nations with a separate 
timetable as well as financial aid from the industrialized 
nations. 
Because of the anarchic nature of the international 
system, cooperative efforts, such as environmental treaties, 
are difficult to accomplish. A decision to cooperatively deal 
with a given environmental problem, such as ozone depletion, 
will only be undertaken if the likelihood of success is high. 
The combination of several factors worked to increased the 
likelihood of success. 22 First of all, the scope of the 
problem was manageable. "The ozone problem appears to be more 
tractable and more amenable to resolution [than global 
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warming]. That may be because CFCs, the main offenders, are 
less vital to core functions of society, and because they can 
be controlled by regulating a single industry. " 23 The 
relative ease with which the ozone problem could be solved, 
greatly heightened the negotiation's chances of success. 
A second factor leading to success, was the scientific 
consensus that gradually evolved concerning ozone depletion. 
At the time of the Protocol's signing, scientists suspected 
but had not definitively proven that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) 
emission resulted in ozone depletion. The release of a major 
scientific report in 1988 confirmed the earlier theories 
regarding ozone depletion. The NASA/NOAA document 
definitively proved significantly decreased levels of ozone. 
Although the report failed to directly implicate CFCs, the 
ozone loss was attended by high levels of the chlorine of 
CFCs.~ By confirming the theory of the ozone threat, this 
report would be instrumental in building international support 
for accession to the treaty. 
The third factor in the success of the Protocol was the 
support of the major actors: states, nongovernmental 
organizations, international organizations, and, eventually, 
industry. 25 Shortly after the release of the NASA report, 
Dupont, a major manufacturer of CFCs, announced it would 
discontinue production of CFCs. Although the company cited 
environmental reasons for its decision, it "has been a leader 
in the search for substitutes, which experts say could become 
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a major new source of company sales."26 Dupont's stance on 
the ozone problem was, at least in part, related to its bottom 
line. 
The support of the chemical industry is directly tied to 
the final factor, the availability of substitutes. While a 
safe, lowcost substitute was not yet available when the first 
nations signed the protocol, industry had been working on a 
substitute since the mid-1970s. This research increased as 
the likelihood of a CFC ban rose.~ The above four factors 
would prove strong enough to overcome the natural, 
decentralizing forces of the international system and result 
in the international prohibition of CFCs. 
The Effort to Ban Chlorofluorocarbons 
By the time of the Montreal Protocol, CFCs had become an 
integral part of life in an industrialized society. First 
discovered by General Motors in 1931, CFCs were employed in 
• 
refrigeration, air conditioning, insulation, and later, 
electronics. Although concern for the ozone layer had 
originally arisen from the prospect of commercial supersonic 
flights, in 1974, scientists theorized that CFC emissions also 
damaged the ozone layer. Depletion of the ozone layer could 
be harmful to marine life and result in increased cancer in 
humans. 28 
Despite the absence of conclusive scientific data, the 
severity of the threat and increasing scientific evidence had 
produced an international consensus on the need to address the 
81 
problem. An international conference met in Vienna in 1985 
to try to resolve the problem. Two opposing blocs emerged 
there, one led by the EEC and the other, the Toronto group, 
led by the United States. These two factions were unable to 
agree on proposed actions to reduce the level of CFC emission. 
Instead of an accord binding states to specific actions, the 
conference chose to sign a general, nonbinding agreement - the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The 
treaty, actually a framework for future action, called for 
international cooperation, research, and information 
sharing. 29 
Continuing concern for the ozone layer, increasing 
scientific knowledge, and ongoing negotiation among the 
parties led to the signing of a protocol in September of 1987. 
While the Vienna Convention served as a general framework and 
established monitoring procedures, the Montreal Protocol 
actually committed states to concrete and measurable actions 
to reduce the rate of ozone depletion. 
While the Stockholm Declaration stated the importance of 
treating developing nations differently from developed ones, 
"the Montreal Protocol is highly unusual, perhaps unique, 
because it defines "developing countries. " 30 Because the 
Protocol goes on to treat developing and developed nations 
differently, this definition is a key aspect of the treaty. 
Because development has been synonymous with the use of 
CFCs, the "developed" nations are at much greater fault for 
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the current ozone depletion problem. In 1986, the developed 
nations consumed 84% of the CFCs produced; developing nations 
accounted for only 1 6% (of which the populous nations of China 
and India make up only 2%) . 31 Even if the Montreal Protocol 
proved successful in substantially reducing the 84% created by 
developed nations, future industrialization and modernization 
by populous Third World nations would severely undercut the 
effort by the North. As Third World nations seek the basic 
comforts of modern life, such as refrigeration, their 
increased consumption of CFCs seriously threatens the ozone 
layer. 32 Thus, the underlying North-South conflict: 
environmental protection or economic development? 
In an effort to provide both protection and development, 
the Protocol contains differing goals for developed and 
developing nations. Article 2 of the Protocol describes the 
different timelines and reduction levels for developed and 
developing countries, while Article 5 sets the criteria by 
which a state is considered to be developing. To accommodate 
the increasing industrialization of developing nations, their 
rate of reduction is less rapid and their phaseout period is 
extended. 
Gaining the Support of the South 
As it turned out, Article 5 insufficiently addressed the 
concerns of developing nations. While the major 
industrialized nations agreed to the Protocol, there were 
significant absences from the developing world. Of the 
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twenty-four nations that signed, most were industrialized 
nations. China and India, representing 1.9 billion people or 
37% of the world's population, 33 served notice they would not 
be signing the accord. 
Accumulating scientific evidence highlighted the need for 
accession by the Southern nations. Whereas the negotiations 
prior to 1987 had taken place largely among Northern nations, 
after the major industrialized consumers had signed on, the 
ozone depletion issue took on a strong North-South character. 
The weight of scientific evidence and the availability of 
CFC substitutes caused the North to move with increasing speed 
toward total phaseout of CFCs. This prospect affected the 
position that had been adopted by the developing countries at 
Montreal. Richard Benedick, the American negotiator at 
Montreal, writes: 
By 1989 the objectives of the developing-country 
negotiators had undergone significant change. At 
Montreal their preoccupation, reflected in the 
negotiations over article 5, was primarily to maintain 
maximum usage of CFCs for the longest possible grace 
period. But with the industrialized countries now on a 
fast track toward phaseout ... it would now be in the 
interest of developing countries . . . to move as rapidly 
as possible to new technologies--and to ensure that help 
was available to accomplish this.~ 
This change of strategy on the part of the developing 
countries, meant that the Montreal Protocol, as it stood, 
failed to address their concerns. 
The Protocol's differential treatment of developing 
nations was intended to allow them to continue to modernize 
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with CFC technology. However, the rapidity of phaseout in the 
North, would obsolete some of the CFC technology. It made 
little sense for the Third World to modernize with obsolete 
technology. The South saw the need to acquire the new, and 
probably more expensive technology. Accordingly, it now 
negotiated for adequate financial assistance and "preferential 
and noncommercial transfer of technology. " 35 
A series of international negotiations, from 1 988 to 
1990, discussed the question of technological and financial 
aid for the developing nations. China and India, both 
nonparties to the original agreement, insisted on the creation 
of a technology transfer fund to provide them with access to 
nonpolluting technology. 36 They saw ozone depletion as a 
problem of the developed world and demanded that the 
industrialized nations pay for the harm they had done. The 
Indian Environment Minister stated: "Lest someone in this 
conference think of this as charity, I would like to remind 
them of the excellent principle of 'polluter pays' adopted in 
the developed world. 1137 
Although the Montreal Protocol contained provisions 
restricting CFC trade between parties to the treaty and 
nonparties, the large populations of India and China ensured 
a market for their domestic CFC production. If they chose to, 
these two giants of the developing world could continue to 
destroy the ozone. A 1989 editorial in the journal, South, 
wrote as follows: 
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Unless a technology transfer fund is started to help 
developing countries switch to safer chemicals, such 
countries as China and India will have no alternative but 
to continue producing and using CFCs for refrigeration, 
air-conditioning, and other essential uses. And without 
international economic reforms the people of the South 
will have no option but to pollute to survive.~ 
A number of contentious issues surrounded the topic of 
funding, including the question of "additionality," and the 
voting procedure of the executive committee. Additionality 
referred to whether the funds donated by the industrialized 
nations would be in addition to existing financial aid or in 
place of it. At one point, the Bush administration reversed 
the American position on additionality, refusing to pledge 
additional funds. Because the U.S. had been the leader of the 
international movement to reduce CFC emissions, this sudden 
change of stance jeopardized the success of the treaty 
itself . 39 The matter was settled at a London conference held 
in 1990. Responding to both domestic and international 
pressure, the United States dropped its opposition to 
addi tionali ty and the establishment of a new multilateral 
fund. 40 
Incentives were also formalized in agreements reached in 
London for commitments to technology transfer, and 
(pending the creation of a permanent Financial Mechanism) 
for the establishment of an Interim Multilateral Fund . 
. contributed principally by developed states to aid 
the implementation of the Protocol through non-ozone-
depletin~ development in developing countries which are 
parties. 1 
Following U.S. agreement to the funding mechanism, China gave 
86 
indications that it would sign the revised protocol. With 
China's agreement, considered a breakthrough, India remained 
the last major developing country not a signatory to the 
treaty. 42 
The voting procedure of the executive council to 
administer the fund, developed into another North-South issue. 
The matter of voting relates back to the doctrine of sovereign 
equality and majoritarian rule. Because the committee would 
be empowered to act only in a narrow area, majoritarian rule 
based on sovereign equality could be considered. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the large number of Third World states allows 
them to dominate international bodies that vote solely 
according to sovereign equality. In an effort to restrict 
this type of power, the developed states originally sought to 
adopt consensus voting for the executive committee. This 
would have avoided the majoritarian situation of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
The developing countries, of course, 
straightforward two-thirds majority rule. " 43 
preferred "a 
The eventual 
decision represented something of a compromise in which both 
sides won the ability to block action. Decisions would be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of all nations present, along 
with a simple majority within both the developed and 
developing blocs.~ This issue pitted the negative power of 
the South against the economic power of the North--and a 
compromise was the result. Given the traditional weakness of 
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the South, even a compromise can be considered a victory. 
Summary 
The overpowering military and economic strength of the 
North has always placed it in a predominant position in its 
dealings with the weaker nations of the South. While the 
Stockholm Declaration set a precedent by adopting the concept 
of differential treatment, the agreement's nonbinding status 
greatly undercuts the impact of this concession. However, the 
inclusion of the concept in the Montreal Protocol, 
demonstrates how nonbinding agreements can serve as 
"signposts" for future international law. 
Global environmental negotiations often divide along 
North-South lines because of the nature of pollution. North 
and South often differ as to who is at greatest fault and who 
should pay to correct the damage. The South won concessions 
from the North because the situation met the three 
requirements of negative power. The North became convinced 
that ozone depletion represented a serious threat. The 
South's choice of a path to industrialization would have a 
major effect on the ozone depletion problem. And, those 
Southern nations with the greatest leverage, in particular, 
India and China, maintained solidarity with the bloc. 
Because of the negative power of the South, the North 
agreed to the establishment of a new multilateral fund, it 
agreed to addi tionali ty, and it agreed to "special" 
majoritarian voting on the Executive Committee. Given the 
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traditional weakness of the South, these concessions 
demonstrate the presence of some power other than military and 
economic. The concessions confirm the existence of the 
"negative" power of the South, that is, its ability to 
withhold its agreement on matter of international cooperation 
deemed critical by the North. The next chapter will evaluate 
the effect of this power in the global warming talks at the 
Rio Summit in 1992. 
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CHAPTER V 
NEGATIVE POWER AND 
THE GLOBAL WARMING NEGOTIATIONS 
The ability of the South to win concessions during the 
ozone depletion talks, confirmed the existence of a new type 
of power for the poor, weak states of the South. In order for 
this negative power of the South to be operative, three 
conditions must be present: the North must perceive a serious 
environmental threat, the South must have influence over that 
threat, and the members of the Southern bloc must successfully 
resist defection from the group. Under these circumstances, 
the militarily and economically weak nations of the Third 
World have sufficient leverage to extract concessions from the 
powerful North. 
The Montreal agreement was deemed a success because it 
showed that the members of the anarchic, international system 
could agree to forego short-term gains when faced with the 
possibility of major ecological damage. Following the 
successful conclusion of the treaty, "there were calls from 
the environmental and scientific community for a similar 
international agreement on the global warming issue. " 1 
Because of the South's growing population and 
industrialization, the global warming issue seemed to offer it 
another opportunity to take advantage of its newfpund negative 
power. 
Although both ozone depletion and global warming 
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represent environmental damage resulting from anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases2 into the atmosphere, the 
problems differ significantly. The previous chapter explained 
how the success of the Montreal Protocol was due to four 
factors that ultimately reduced the costs for and increased 
the likelihood of benefits from an agreement. This chapter 
will compare the global warming and ozone depletion talks; it 
will look for the presence of North-South issues at the 
climate change negotiations, and ask whether the conditions 
existed for the negative power of the South to win concessions 
from the North. 
Background to 
The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 
The phenomenon of global warming results from the 
presence of certain types of gases in the atmosphere, referred 
to as greenhouse gases (GHG). The presence of these gases, a 
natural phenomenon, has been beneficial in the past by warming 
the planet to the point where it supported life. While the 
presence of greenhouse gases is a natural phenomenon, human 
existence has always supplemented this supply. By burning 
biomass to cook, to heat, to light, humans have released 
additional amounts of the greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, into 
the air. The industrial revolution, largely made possible by 
the combustion of fossil fuels, greatly increased the level of 
anthropogenic emissions. Up until the time of the industrial 
revolution, these emissions had been insufficient to 
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significantly affect the atmosphere. However, by the late 
twentieth century, the rates of release had risen to a point 
where the concentrations of greenhouse gases "were increasing 
over their natural levels."3 
While scientists have known of the warming effect of 
greenhouse gases since the mid-nineteenth century, it was not 
until the 1960s and 1970s that they questioned the effects of 
large increases of atmospheric carbon dioxide. They 
hypothesized that the rising C02 levels could result in 
increased global warming with potentially catastrophic 
effects. These effects could include "sea-level rise, changed 
rainfall and storm patterns, with consequent desertification 
and flooding, agricultural migration ... and perhaps other 
unpredicted impacts."4 
In 1988, due to the growing concern about global warming, 
the United Nations created a body to study the issue of 
climate change--the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Two years later, the United Nations followed this by 
a call for multilateral discussions on a climate change 
treaty. Noting the threat posed by global warming, the 
General Assembly established the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee on a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) . 5 
An international conference on the environment was to be 
convened in June of 1992. It was hoped that the INC would 
have worked out the nuts and bolts of the treaty by that time; 
only final negotiations and signing would take place at the 
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United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) • The conference was intended to culminate in the 
signing of five major international agreements on the 
environment: the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, Forest 
Principles, and treaties on biodiversity and climate change. 6 
This chapter will concentrate on the negotiations of the 
global warming treaty at the INC and UNCED. 
North-South Issues of the Conference 
Much of the negotiation for the Earth Summit and parts of 
the negotiation over global warming were characterized by 
North-South conflict. The conflict followed a line familiar 
since Stockholm in 1972. The North asserted the need for a 
cleaner development process to save the environment. The 
South responded that the environmental damage had occurred as 
a result of the North's cheap and dirty path to 
industrialization. The developing nations, just now venturing 
down that enriching but polluting path, feel that they enjoy 
a right to development . 
. if anyone has to put a curb on development, it 
should be the North and not the South because the South 
has yet to develop and needs to grow . . . the 
development of the South can in no way be compromised by 
the North's preemption of global environment space. 7 
While environmental talks frequently center on the 
present pollution of the industrialized North and the future 
pollution of the industrializing South, development is not the 
only anthropogenic cause of pollution. Underdevelopment 
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itself may damage the environment. "Impoverished people can 
be as destructive to the environment as industrialization."8 
For example, poverty may force people to chop down valuable 
forests to clear land for subsistence farming. Environmental 
concerns become secondary to basic concerns for human life. 
In the tradition of the Founex Report of Stockholm, 9 the 
South maintained that the issues of environment and 
development cannot be considered separately. The wording 
chosen for the conference name reflects the early drawing of 
battle lines between North and South. The North envisioned 
environmental negotiations (the 'E' in UNCED), while the South 
insisted that the conference be on the subjects of both 
environment and development (therefore the 'D'). The 
conference name is indicative of many North-South agreements. 
The final wording simply restates the opposing views rather 
than indicating a mutually accepted compromise. 
Third World nations believe that many of their problems 
result from their underdevelopment. Since the days of the 
NIEO, they sought to alleviate this condition through 
technology transfers, and financial aid from the North. While 
nonbinding resolutions such as the NIEO proved ineffective in 
obtaining Northern cooperation, global environmental problems 
seemed to offer the South new opportunities to press their 
agenda. 
Similar to the ozone depletion problem, ultimate success 
on a global warming treaty depended upon the agreement of the 
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South. As of 1992, the 130 odd developing nations accounted 
for four-fifths of the world's population and one-sixth of its 
economic output . 10 According to the World Resources 
Institute, the top six producers of greenhouse gases in 1991 
were: the United States, the U.S.S.R., Brazil, China, India, 
and Japan. 11 The growing populations and rising 
industrialization of the South, could only increase their 
environmental impact. 
A number of developing nations believed that the global 
warming issue provided them with power over the North. 
Determined to extract concessions at Rio, the developing 
nations met at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to map out a coordinated 
strategy for the talks. Recognizing the power of the South on 
environmental matters, the Prime Minister of Malaysia told G77 
members, "Fear of the North of environmental degradation 
provides the South the leverage that did not exist before. It 
is fully justified for us to approach it this way. " 12 
Some nations believed that the environmental crisis would 
provide the South with the opportunity to implement new means 
of financial transfers. A Wall Street Journal article 
entitled "Rio Agenda: Soak the West's Taxpayers," reported 
that Brazil and Argentina submitted a list of potential 
mechanisms to accomplish this transfer. The list included 
such ideas as a tax on all newspapers, and a special postage 
stamp called Greenmail (the article made mention of 
blackmail.) 13 
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The South's threatened play of the environmental card 
suffered from two weaknesses. First, if the South chose the 
dirty path to development, and the global warming threat was 
real, the vulnerable nations of the South stood to lose more 
than the North. Second, the "weak administrative and market 
institutions of the South may prevent them from reaching 
reduction targets even if they agreed to them. " 14 While the 
South had succeeded in gaining concessions at Montreal, the 
question was, did global warming offer them the same 
opportunity? 
Differences between the Problems of 
Ozone Depletion and Global Warming 
Chapter IV suggested that the success of the Montreal 
Protocol can be traced to four factors: the manageability of 
the problem, the availability of substitute technology, the 
evolution of a scientific consensus, and the lack of 
opposition by major actors. Although the Montreal accord has 
been sometimes held up as a model for a global warming 
agreement, the two issues differ significantly on the basis of 
these four factors. 15 
In terms of the manageability of the problem, ozone 
depletion is a much more tractable problem than global 
warming. Only a handful of gases caused the ozone depletion 
problem and a small number of companies manufactured them. 16 
Global warming, on the other hand, results from the emission 
of a variety of greenhouse gases, in particular carbon 
dioxide, which is a byproduct of the combustion of fossil 
99 
fuels. 
As an example of the comparative costs of the two 
problems, one source estimated the U.S. cost of CFC reduction 
to be $2.7 billion, while the report estimated that a 20% cut 
in carbon dioxide emission would cost between $800 billion and 
$3. 6 trillion. 17 Obviously the reduction of emission sources 
is a much more expensive problem in the case of global warming 
than ozone depletion. 
While the North's use of fossil fuel is the chief 
emission source of greenhouse gases, another major source is 
the burning of biomass by developing nations. But this 
pollution is the byproduct of the struggle to survive. It can 
only be addressed by alleviating the poverty of the Third 
World--vastly increasing the scope of the undertaking. 
The ways of life of both developed and developing nations 
are based upon the burning of carbon and thus indirectly the 
production of carbon dioxide. To limit carbon dioxide 
emission, Southern poverty and Northern industrialization must 
undergo radical change. The future development of North and 
South is affected differently by substantial reductions of 
GHGs. "In the industrialized world the issue is one of 
economic cost, growth, and comparative advantage; in the 
developing world the issue is more fundamental, entailing 
delaying or even foregoing economic development. " 18 This is 
the nub of the North-South debate on the environment. 
The second factor that accounted for the success at 
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Montreal was the availability of CFC substitute technology. 
The effort to find substitute sources for fossil fuel has been 
both more complicated and less successful. Alternative 
sources such as nuclear, solar power, geothermal, or hydrogen 
have not yet demonstrated their cost-effectiveness. The 
universal usage of fossil fuels and the absence of acceptable 
substitutes greatly increases the costs of GHG reduction. 
The third factor, scientific consensus, highlights 
another major difference between ozone depletion and global 
warming. As stated in the last chapter, scientific opinion 
coalesced behind the ozone depletion theory during the course 
of the negotiations. However, due to the complexity of the 
global warming debate, scientific opinion on the merits of the 
global warming argument remains divided. The IPCC, often 
considered to be the most authoritative source, issued its 
First Assessment Report in 1990. While the report did 
forecast a global temperature increase and sea-level rise, it 
stated that there are many uncertainties as "to the timing, 
magnitude and regional patterns of climate change. " 19 
Wilfred Beckerman argues that despite the best efforts of 
scientists, the global warming phenomenon remains poorly 
understood. Furthermore, Beckerman states that: "although 
there are enormous uncertainties in both the science and 
economics of global warming, the damage done by global warming 
is likely to be far less than the costs that would be incurred 
by hasty and draconian measures to reduce GHG emissions. " 20 
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It is not the aim of this paper to argue the merits of the 
global warming argument; it is sufficient to note that great 
debate continues to surround the theory. 
The last of the four areas in which to contrast the two 
treaties is that of the opposition of major actors. The 
Montreal Protocol eventually enjoyed the support of all the 
major actors involved: governments, IGOs, and industry. 
Although the North was originally split into two camps, led by 
the U.S. and the E.C., the increasing weight of scientific 
argument eventually brought them together. Having achieved 
consensus among the developed countries, the negotiations took 
on a North-South character at that point. 
Just as they had during the ozone talks, the U.S. and the 
EC again found themselves on opposite sides. However, in this 
case, America played the role of the laggard rather than the 
leader. 
The United States, which had taken the lead in efforts to 
coordinate international action on the most significant 
global environmental accord to date--the Montreal 
Protocol dealing with stratospheric ozone depletion--
found itself at odds with virtually all the other major 
advanced industrial nations when it came to accepting 
firm, binding international commitments as a first step 
towards averting the environmental catastrophe believed 
to result from the "greenhouse effect. "21 
Elements in the climate change issue would cause nations to 
defect from the North-South alignment that had dominated other 
environmental negotiations. According to Peter Hayes, "The 
concepts of 'South' and 'North-South' conflict may be obsolete 
102 
and irrelevant in the climate change arena. Indeed, since 
late 1991, negotiations over climate change have resulted in 
a fractured and pragmatic set of political axes. " 22 
New International Alignments 
The negotiations at Rio proved somewhat more complex than 
those of Montreal because the summit dealt with multiple 
environmental problems. The differing nature of these 
problems resulted in shifting coalitions dependent on the 
issue. The lack of solidarity among North and South 
strengthens the conception of them as pressure groups rather 
than blocs. 
Parallel negotiating groups worked out the terms of the 
agreements to be signed at the conference. One group, the 
Preparatory Committee of UNCED (Prepcom) , negotiated the terms 
of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. The broad, nonbinding 
agreements negotiated by this group, produced the same North-
South ethos as the Montreal talks. Another negotiating group, 
the INC, worked out the terms of the climate change treaty. 
Rather than re-creating the North-South alignment of the 
Prepcom talks, "the fault lines in the INC are as often among 
developed countries as between developed and developing 
countries. " 23 
The concepts of North and South applied to the Montreal 
talks because the discussions eventually resolved themselves 
into the matter of environment versus development--the North 
feared for its environment while the South sought to protect 
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its future development. At the global warming talks, on the 
other hand, the presence of crosscutting issues overrode the 
env1ronment-development dichotomy. The thermal change might 
cause minimal problems for some nations while devastating 
others. 24 For some nations, the potential accord represented 
a greater threat than the possibility of climate change. 
Because the global warming issue threatened to impose 
differential costs on bloc members, national interests did not 
necessarily correspond to the North-South dichotomy. 
The major split within the North occurred between the 
United States and the other developed nations. The U.S., 
which had acted as a leader at both the Stockholm and Montreal 
conferences, opposed a climate change treaty because it "was 
unwilling to impose a substantial burden on the U.S. economy 
without significant corresponding benefits. "25 The U.S. 
adopted a position opposed to reduction targets, or timetables 
by which to achieve them. By virtue of its wealth and 
superior technology, the U.S. believed that it could adapt to 
global warming at minimal cost. 
Unwilling to follow the American lead on the climate 
change issue, the EC led the effort among the developed 
countries to reduce C02 emissions to 1990 levels by the end of 
the century. The New York Times reported that: 
As the Earth Summit enters its final phase, Europe and 
Japan are showing increasing independence from the United 
States on environmental issues, worsening American 
isolation and creating a diplomatic challenge for 
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Washington. 26 
The EC-led group came together for varying reasons. Some 
countries had suffered through trans-boundary acid rain 
problems. O~hers joined the group believing that the cleanup 
effort offered economic opportunities. Others still seemed to 
share a feeling of responsibility for the environment.v 
While the North suffered a schism, the South had even 
greater difficulty maintaining a sense of unity during the 
negotiations. In an effort to present a united front, 
delegates of the South met in Geneva in 1991 to craft a common 
position. To maintain solidarity, this group adopted a 
platform that stressed the fundamental issues that separated 
the developed and developing worlds--the South's need for 
environmental space and economic development. The platform 
asserted that since the North is largely responsible for the 
current pollution, environmental problems could not be used as 
a justification for denying the South the right to 
industrialize. 28 
Unfortunately for the South, this veneer of solidarity 
broke apart under the strain of the differential costs of the 
climate change issue. 29 As the International Negotiating 
Committee sought to reach agreement on a climate change treaty 
in the closing months before the summit, the unity of the G77 
dissolved. The small, island nations had formed their own 
political bloc, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 
These nations, facing submersion if sea-levels should rise, 
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advocated radical GHG reductions. At the other extreme were 
the large energy producers (the OPEC states) , and large energy 
consumers (e.g. , Brazil, India, and China) . This group 
opposed a strong accord fearing its effect on their economies. 
Between these two extremes lay a large bloc of over 40 nations 
that advocated waiting for the decision of the developed 
countries. 30 
Because the environmental strength of the South resides 
in its member nations, the power of the bloc is dependent upon 
solidarity. The differential impact of the climate change 
issue destroyed that solidarity as developing nations 
rediscovered the diversity of their interests. At one extreme 
were the developing nations that feared the threat of global-
warming, and on the other extreme were those that feared the 
potential costs of alleviating the threat. 
Unable to produce a consensus among their members, the 
developing nations lost the ability to pose a threat to the 
North. "The fragmentation of the South places developing 
countries in a weak bargaining position on the central issues 
of financing, technology transfer, and compensation payments. 
II Jl 
Unlike its position during the Montreal talks, the South 
held little leverage during the negotiations on global 
warming. The richest, most powerful player, the United 
States, failed to perceive a serious threat to its interests. 
Furthermore, the ability of the South to deliver on the threat 
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was questionable. And finally, in the face of differential 
costs to bloc members, the South failed to maintain the 
required solidarity. Without a plausible threat to the North 
or the means to carry it out, the South entered the final 
negotiations from a position of weakness. 
The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Al though authors such as Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin 
have writ ten on the decline of American hegemony, 32 neither 
the EC nor the South accomplished its negotiating goals in the 
face of American opposition. U.S. objections to the inclusion 
of targets or timetables in the treaty, forced the other 
states to choose between a stronger treaty lacking American 
participation, or a weaker treaty with it. Rather than go 
without an American signature, the Europeans agreed to a 
compromise. They agreed to accept a general framework 
document rather than a legally binding treaty containing 
targets and timetables. In exchange, the United States agreed 
to vague wording calling on all parties to limit their 
emissions with the "aim" of returning to 1990 levels. 33 
Environmentalists were critical of the weakened agreement. 
''The climate treaty is now a shell that will allow continued 
degradation of the global atmosphere. Faced with an ultimatum 
from the U.S., the Europeans have abandoned their promise to 
include binding commitments in the treaty."~ 
Given the weak negotiating position of the developing 
nations, it is not surprising that they, like the EC, failed 
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to win much in the way of binding commitments. The South did 
manage to include the notion of differential treatment for 
developing nations, which had originated in Stockholm. 
Similar to Montreal, they won a com.mi tment for "new and 
additional financial resources" rather than a re-allocation of 
existing funds. While the North acceded to the Southern 
demand to provide "the agreed full costs incurred by the 
developing country Parties in complying with their 
obligations, " 35 the treaty fails to define these costs leaving 
the matter open to future interpretation. The South also 
succeeded in including language that stated that fulfillment 
of their treaty obligations would be dependent upon the 
North's fulfillment of its financial obligations.~ 
The question of the institution to administer the 
financial aid also became a North-South issue. The developed 
countries favored an expansion of the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), a fund controlled by the World Bank and over 
which the North had greater control. On the other hand, the 
developing countries preferred the establishment of a new 
Green Fund, independent of the World Bank, which would 
provide the developing nations with greater access. The 
compromise decision favored the North. The additional 
financial assistance would be channeled through the GEF; 
however, it would be reformed to allow greater Southern 
control. 37 Given the contentiousness of the negotiations and 
the number of unknowns, the climate change treaty did not 
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attempt to establish the level of funding to be provided by 
the North, but left that for future negotiation. 
SUMMARY 
While the South won a few concessions at the climate 
change negotiations, there was little that was both new and 
binding. The concessions gained by the South at Montreal were 
a result of the presence of the three requirements of the 
South's negative power. The North perceived a vital interest 
to be at risk - the protection lent by the ozone layer. The 
South had influence over the threat to the North, future 
Southern industrialization. And the South maintained its 
solidari ty--the two powerhouses, India and China, consistently 
acted as spokespersons for the developing nations. 
These three requirements were not met at the global 
warming talks. The United States, the chief player of the 
North, failed to perceive a threat. The ability of the South 
to deliberately influence global warming was questionable. 
And the South failed to maintain any sort of solidarity during 
the talks. The negative power of the South is necessarily 
more limited than military or economic power. Although the 
South threatened "to play a climate destruction card in a slow 
motion game of global climate change poker," 38 it walked away 




While all power is subject to constraints, the negative 
power of the South is particularly reliant on the presence of 
certain conditions. The power of sovereign equality and 
negative power are two of the few sources of Southern strength 
in the international system. But unlike military or economic 
strength, the South's powers lack the ability to threaten in 
and of themselves. The power of sovereign equality is the 
power to recommend, not to compel; while negative power relies 
upon the presence of an already existing threat. 
The two strengths of the South, sovereign equality and 
negative power, are not necessarily independent of each other. 
They can be effective when used together. At both Stockholm 
and Rio, the Third World used its majority in the General 
Assembly to ensure that development issues became an integral 
part of the discussions of the conferences. While both 
sovereign equality and negative power provide the South with 
greater international leverage, the battle between North and 
South continues to be a conflict between vast unequals. 
The terminology, "North" and "South," is misleading in 
itself; it seems to equate this struggle with that other 
hemispheric confrontation, East vs. West. The fundamental 
difference between the two struggles lies in the power 
differential between the blocs. In the East-West conflict, 
superpowers acted as hegernons for blocs of developed 
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countries, in a military and economic struggle. Concern about 
the confrontation arose because of the terrible strength of 
the two sides. The North-South conflict, on the other hand, 
is a struggle which pits the weakest nations against the 
strongest--international equity, not international 
destruction, is the issue. Given the weakness of the South, 
this dispute necessarily takes place at the negotiating table 
rather than in a battlefield or trade war. 
The South's inability to directly threaten, stems from 
two factors: the weakness of the bloc members, and the 
superficial nature of bloc unity. The developing states are 
mostly former colonies that became independent as a result of 
international politics rather than their own state of 
readiness. These states suffer from chronic military and 
economic weakness, largely due to their underdevelopment. 
The Third World is composed of a wide variety of nations 
with correspondingly diverse interests. While the members of 
the East and West had united when faced with a threat to their 
security, the members of the Third World had united in 
opposition to the disparity of wealth between North and South. 
However, given the extent of the diversity within the Third 
World, this accusation is in some ways a hollow argument. 
Although there is a great disparity between the richest of the 
industrialized and the poorest of the developing countries, 
the dividing line between the two groups is somewhat 
artificial. 
114 
For example, it is true that Bhutan has a GNP per capita 
of only $70 per year, while developed countries such as Italy 
have a per capita of $3440 and the United States has an 
average income of $8520. However, Third World countries like 
Venezuela and Argentina have incomes of close to $2000 per 
year1 • Economic weal th is a spectrum, not a dichotomy. 
Because of the many differences among the developing nations, 
the bond uniting the South is at times more words than deeds. 
The superficial nature of that bond was demonstrated 
during the global warming talks. Because the nations of the 
South span the spectrum of development, the global warming 
issue imposed unequal costs upon the bloc members. The 
differential costs of both the threat and the response to it, 
overcame the bond that united an already disparate group. 
While the weakness of the developing nations precludes 
them from challenging the North either militarily or 
economically, the South does enjoy superiority in at least one 
area--nurnber of countries. This numerical superiority becomes 
a factor in international organizations based on sovereign 
equality. Although the United Nations General Assembly had 
been controlled by a Western majority in its early years, in 
1960 that ability would pass to the developing world. 
Although Third World control meant a greater forum for 
development issues, the change would have limited effect on 
world affairs. Because of the hortatory nature of General 
Assembly resolutions, in themselves they can accomplish few 
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changes. Yet, although limited, the new power is still real. 
General Assembly resolutions help to set the international 
agenda and may, in some cases, serve as signposts of future 
international law. 
The power of sovereign equality is dependent upon 
solidarity. Unity that is based solely on opposition may be 
relatively easy to create, however, it lacks the coherent set 
of ideas needed in order to become a viable political 
movement. The South coalesced into such a movement at the 
first meeting of the UNCTAD. It was during the negotiations 
of this conference that nations first aligned themselves into 
North and South. Led by Raul Prebisch, the developing nations 
adopted the structuralist argument as the ideology of their 
movement. 
Structuralism justified Third World calls for financial 
aid and reforms of the economic system; the argument claimed 
that the current system favored the rich at the expense of the 
poor. Because of the Southern majority in the General 
Assembly, this cry for international equity would be 
eventually adopted in a series of resolutions called the New 
International Economic Order. Despite these resolutions, 
relatively little changed in the world economy. 
The failure of the NIEO demonstrates that power, not 
morals, governs the operation of the international system. 
While the Third World power of sovereign equality can shape 
the international agenda, changes in international regimes 
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require the cooperation of the powerful. 
The power to set the agenda alone is insufficient, it 
must be supplemented by the ability to threaten a "bad" 
(power) or withhold a "good" (negative power). The negative 
power enjoyed by the South reflects its ability to influence 
an asset that the North deems valuable. By threatening to 
withhold its agreement to global environmental treaties, the 
South jeopardizes Northern efforts to control serious 
environmental problems. Negative power is the power to 
prevent a good rather than cause a "bad." 
For this negative power to be present, three conditions 
must be met. First, whether a serious threat exists or not, 
the North must perceive it to be so. Second, policy decisions 
of the developing nations must have a substantial influence 
upon the threat. And finally, the South must maintain a solid 
front while negotiating with the North. 
Both ozone depletion and global warming presented the 
South with the opportunity to take advantage of its negative 
power. In both cases, atmospheric pollution had threatened to 
cause serious and irreversible environmental damage; the 
future development of the South promised to exacerbate the 
problem. While the ozone depletion issue met the three 
requirements, global warming did not. 
The North perceived a serious environmental threat in 
ozone depletion, while it failed to do so in the case of 
global warming. Although it seemed likely that the South 
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could deliberately influence the CFC problem, global warming 
appeared less tractable to governmental solutions. Lastly, in 
contrast to ozone depletion, the global warming problem 
imposed differential costs upon bloc members. The innate 
diversity of the Third World overcame the bond that had united 
them. In order for negative power to be operable, all three 
conditions must be met. Thus, the South won significant 
concessions at Montreal but not at Rio. 
Negative power has been of limited use to the South up 
until now, largely because at least one of these three 
conditions has not been met. In the future, certainly the 
first two requirements will be met. As the environmental 
pollution of the populous South becomes added to that of the 
North, global environmental problems will assume greater and 
greater centrality. Although the South certainly will not 
choose to forego development to save the environment, its 
choice of development paths can have a major impact. The 
third requirement, solidarity, is more difficult to predict. 
While future environmental problems will create 
opportunities 
dependent on 
for Southern power, its success 
the South's ability to arrive at 
will be 
a common 
negotiating position. Given the amount of diversity that 
exists in the South, it will have difficulty maintaining 
solidarity across the wide range of potential environmental 
problems. It seems likely that neither the power of sovereign 
equality nor negative power will rival the military and 
11 8 
economic power of the North in the foreseeable future. 
However, both do represent real sources of power, and as such 
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